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Abstract: This paper experimentally studies individuals’ voluntary disclosure of past behaviors 
and its effects in a finitely repeated two-player public goods game. The experiment data found 
that voluntary information disclosure strengthens cooperation under certain conditions, although 
a non-negligible fraction of individuals do not disclose information about the past and proceed to 
behave opportunistically. On closer inspection, the data revealed that the material incentives of 
disclosure acts differ according to the matching protocol. Specifically, disclosers receive higher 
payoffs than non-disclosers if the disclosers are assured to be matched with like-minded 
disclosers; conversely, disclosers are vulnerable to exploitation by others under random 
matching. These results suggest that mandatory disclosure helps enhance economic efficiency if 
individuals’ hiding and uncooperative behaviors are liable to precipitate a collapse in the 
community norms. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper experimentally explores whether voluntary disclosure of past behaviors 
improves cooperation in a public goods game. Answering this question helps understand recent 
development of reputation mechanisms on online-based transactions (e.g., Uber). The reputation 
mechanism in the field is a forced disclosure system, whereby users’ ratings and reviews for past 
transactions are always available to potential counterparties. Prior experiments have shown that 
the mandatory disclosure of information on individuals’ past behaviors can mitigate dilemmas and 
improve cooperation, even in finitely repeated setups (e.g., Engelmann and Fischbacher, 2009; 
Bolton et al., 2004, 2005; Kamei and Putterman, 2017).1 While economists have recently begun to 
study people’s possible endogenous formation of reputational information in several formats,2 it 
remains unclear how the market would look if users could voluntarily disclose their reputations 
(past behaviors). A voluntary disclosure system may be theoretically similar to a mandatory 
disclosure system if ‘rational’ cooperation occurs as discussed in Kreps et al. (1982). But if this is 
the case, one might wonder why mandatory, not voluntary, disclosure has been consistently 
adopted by the online platforms for users’ ratings.3  
This study utilizes the framework of a finitely repeated two-player public goods game for 
its sharp standard theory prediction. A parsimonious design is adopted by using a simple 
disclosure format. If a player decides to disclose in a given period, her matched partner observes 
the player’s last period action choice before their interaction commences. A similar, but 
exogenous, disclosure system has been used in prior prisoner’s dilemma game setups (e.g., 
Kandori, 1992; Stahl, 2013) and investment game setups (e.g., Bolton et al., 2004).  
                                                          
1 The positive impact of exogenously given information has also been demonstrated in indefinitely repeated 
dilemma game experiments with random matching (e.g., Camera and Casari, 2009; Kamei, 2017). 
2
 Recent research explored people’s reputation building through gossiping (e.g., Camera and Casari, 2018; Kamei 
and Putterman, 2018), information acquisition (e.g., Camera and Casari, 2018; Duffy et al., 2013), identity 
disclosure (Kamei, 2017), and endogenous dissolution of relationships (e.g., Honhon and Hyndman, 2019).  
3 Although mandatory disclosure is more common than voluntary disclosure, it is not universal. For instance, in 
China, people hold reputational information built on online platforms, so-called ‘social credit’, and they are actively 
encouraged to reveal the scores to potential transaction counterparts even outside the platforms (e.g., Hatton, 2015). 
Users’ disclosure behaviors and the value of disclosure are of great interest to scholars as well as practitioners.  
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The results of the experiment show that endogenously disclosed information improves 
cooperation under certain conditions. However, not everyone discloses, even if disclosure is free. 
Besides, the impact of disclosed information is weak when subjects are randomly matched with 
other subjects in their community in each period (especially when disclosure involves a cost) 
because then a large fraction of subjects are reluctant to disclose their past. A control treatment 
with mandatory disclosure reveals that subjects are able to sustain high cooperation norms if all 
subjects are forced to reveal their past actions. In sum, mandatory disclosure can be a more 
efficient mechanism than voluntary disclosure for reviews on online platforms.  
The experiment further shows that sorting based on disclosure decisions helps disclosers 
achieve a high degree of cooperation with other disclosers.4 The level of cooperation observed 
among the disclosers is comparable to that under mandatory information disclosure. Nevertheless, 
even with sorting, a non-negligible fraction of subjects remain non-disclosers, contribute small 
amounts, and keep receiving low payoffs as a result.  
The closest paper to the present one is Kamei (2017), who focused on people’s reputation 
building behaviors through identity disclosure in an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game 
where mutual cooperation holds as an equilibrium outcome. He found that almost everyone 
discloses their identity and successfully cooperates with each other when hiding it is costly (40% 
of the deviation gain). Aside from the time horizon (finitely versus infinitely repeated), the present 
paper differs from Kamei (2017) in three important aspects. First, this study retains anonymity to 
isolate the effect of disclosed information, showing that the disclosed information of own action 
choices per se has a positive effect.5 Second, this study examines the effect of a disclosure cost 
                                                          
4
 There are many real-world situations where individuals’ sorting behavior is linked to their information disclosure. 
For example, in online markets, individuals can usually access platforms that do not have reputation mechanisms in 
addition to ones with mandatory disclosure (e.g., dating services), and they need to decide which platform to join.  
5 It is worth noting that this paper is also related to the literature on the voluntary information disclosure under 
asymmetric information (e.g., Dranove and Jin [2010]). Using theoretical models and empirical data, past studies 
examined cases in which one party (seller) possesses private information on an exogenous state (e.g., product quality), 
and the other party (buyer) chooses an action after observing both the seller’s disclosure decision and the contents of 
disclosed information. The voluntary information disclosure in this context also has received scant attention in the 
literature on laboratory experiments to date. Benndorf et al. (2015) remark that: “only Forsythe et al. (1989) have 
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rather than a hiding cost, and sets the cost at only 5% of the per-period endowment. The new 
experiment finds that such a small cost strongly affects the subjects’ behaviors. Third, this study 
compares reputation building behaviors between two matching protocols: random matching versus 
sorting, showing that individuals’ contribution behaviors (including material benefits of disclosing 
acts) and the impact of the disclosure cost differ drastically according to the matching protocol. 
Kamei (2017), in contrast, studied people’s identity disclosure behaviors only under random 
matching.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 summarizes the experimental design, 
Section 3 theoretically discusses subjects’ possible behaviors, Sections 4 and 5 report the 
experimental results, and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Experimental Design 
This study is built on the framework of a two-player linear public goods game. The 
experiment consists of 20 interaction periods. The number of interactions is common knowledge 
to all subjects. In each period, every subject is paired with another subject, is given an 
endowment of 20 ECUs (experimental currency units) and simultaneously decides how many 
ECUs they wish to contribute to their pair’s joint account. Subjects’ contribution amounts must 
be integers between 0 and 20. The marginal per capita return (MPCR) is 0.8. Thus, the payoff of 
subject i (𝜋𝑖,𝑡) is calculated as follows: 
 𝜋𝑖,𝑡 = 20 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + .8 ∙ (𝑐𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑐𝑗,𝑡), (1) 
where ci,t is subject i’s contribution to her joint account in period t, and subject j is i’s matched 
person in period t. In order to study the pure impact of voluntary information disclosure in a 
controlled manner, no subject identification numbers are provided in any session.6 
                                                          
studied unraveling in an experiment.” Three further experiments have recently studied subjects’ voluntary disclosure 
in sequential transactions with exogenous states (Hagenbach and Perez-Richet, 2018; Jin et al., 2015; Li and Schipper, 
2018). Unlike all prior studies, Kamei (2017) and this paper study voluntary information disclosure, where the states 
are endogenous (determined by prior actions). 
6
 As an anonymous referee pointed out, if a subject i is matched with j in two consecutive periods (periods t and t + 
1) and j discloses his allocation amount in period t + 1, i may assume that i was matched with the same person j in 
both periods t and t + 1 because of the rich choice space, {0, 1, 2, …, 20}, in the contribution decisions (see 
5 
This study consists of four main treatments (Section 2.1) and control treatments (Section 2.2).  
2.1. Four Main Treatments 
In period 1, each subject is randomly matched with another subject without making any 
disclosure decisions; and then plays the two-player public goods game in their matched pair. Each 
period t, where t > 1, consists of two stages. In the first stage, subjects decide whether to disclose 
their period t – 1 contribution decisions to their period t partners. When a subject chooses to 
disclose, her period t partner is informed of the previous contribution decision; the partner is not 
given this information when the subject decides not to disclose.  
This study constructs four treatments by varying two dimensions using a 22 between-
subjects design (Table 1). The first dimension is the size of the disclosure cost: either the disclosure 
is free or costs one ECU.7 In costly disclosing treatments, one ECU (equal to 5% of the 
endowment) is deducted from a discloser at the end of a given period (a subject has 20 ECUs in her 
allocation-decision stage even when she decides to disclose). The second dimension is the 
matching protocol: either random matching (each subject is randomly matched with another, 
regardless of the disclosure decision) or sorting (each discloser [non-discloser] is randomly 
matched with another discloser [non-discloser] in a given experimental session).8 The four 
treatments are denoted as “Costly Disclosure, Random Matching” (C-RM), “Free Disclosure, 
Random Matching” (F-RM), “Costly Sorting” (C-Sorting), and “Free Sorting” (F-Sorting) 
treatments.  
                                                          
Appendix Fig. C.2 for the cumulative distributions of individual contribution amounts). This feature may provide 
subjects some incentive to build a cooperative reputation. However, any impact should be small for two reasons. 
First, since the session size is 12 in most sessions (footnote 14), the re-matching probability is low (e.g., less than 
10% under random matching). Second, Kamei and Putterman (2017) ran the treatments with a finitely repeated two-
player linear public goods game where only subjects’ IDs were available to each other (the LI-HG and LI-LG 
treatments). Despite being given an ability to choose their partners, cooperation did not evolve in these treatments. 
7
 Disclosure is costly in some real-world situations. For example, on some online dating service, singles may 
disclose their detailed background information by spending time filling in registration forms and/or updating their 
profiles, and also paying membership fees. 
8
 If the number of disclosers is an odd number in a given session under the sorting condition, one discloser is 
randomly matched with a non-discloser. This event happened in only 9.3% (6.9%) of pairings in the C-Sorting (F-
Sorting) treatment. The paper’s findings are robust regardless of whether only data consisting of pairs with the same 
preferences (two disclosers or two non-disclosers) or all data are used.  
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Table 1. Summary of Treatments 
 
Treatment name Disclosure cost  Matching protocol # of sessions (subjects) 
[Main treatments:]   
C-RM 1 ECU Random Matching 4 (48) 
C-Sorting 1 ECU Sorting 4 (44) 
F-RM 0 ECUs Random Matching 4 (44) 
F-Sorting 0 ECUs Sorting 4 (44) 
[Control treatments:]   
Baseline n.a. Random Matching 4 (44) 
C-Sorting-N 1 ECU Sorting 4 (44) 
Mandatory n.a. Random Matching 2 (24) 
Total   26 (292) 
 
 
2.1.1. Conditional Contribution Schedule and Belief Elicitation 
Two additional tasks are included. The first task is the elicitation of beliefs. In each 
allocation-decision stage, subjects are asked about their beliefs regarding the matched partner’s 
contribution amount in a given period t.9 Subjects in the C-RM and F-RM treatments are also 
asked to state their expectation as to the number of disclosers (except themselves) in period t. As 
the primary focus is on subjects’ behaviors and because incentivized elicitation may affect 
subjects’ actual behaviors (e.g., Gächter and Renner 2010), these tasks were not incentivized.10,11 
Second, cooperation types are elicited from subjects using the method of Fischbacher et al. 
(2001). Specifically, each subject is asked how many ECUs, given an endowment of 20 ECUs, 
they wish to allocate to their group, conditional on each of the other group members’ average 
                                                          
9
 In the elicitation stage, subjects are aware of their partners’ current-period disclosure decisions and also the 
partners’ last-period contribution amounts in the case that the partners selected to disclose. 
10
 These elicitation tasks were only explained in the instructions shown on subjects’ computer screens, not in the 
hard copy of instructions distributed to subjects, in order to avoid making the tasks salient. 
11
 Gächter and Renner (2010) showed that incentivized elicitation improves belief accuracy only a little, while it 
significantly influences subjects’ decisions to contribute in a public goods game. One possible way to incentivize 
beliefs is to randomly select some periods for payments based on belief accuracy and the other for payments based on 
the actual contribution behaviors. To reduce the design complexity, this method was not employed. 
Notes: Random Matching = Each subject is randomly matched with another subject in a session. Sorting = Each discloser 
(non-discloser) is matched with another discloser (non-discloser) in a session. 
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contributions (= 0, 1, 2, …, 20). Classified types based on the conditional schedules are used to 
study how subjects’ disclosure and contribution decisions differ by their intrinsic propensity to 
cooperate. This task is incentivized and is included before the finitely repeated public goods 
game.12 Subjects are, however, informed of the outcomes of this task only after they complete the 
20 periods of the public goods game. In addition, neither the group composition nor the outcome 
affects the main repeated dilemma interactions (e.g., pairing process).  
2.2. Control Treatments 
Three control treatments were additionally conducted (Table 1). First, in the “Baseline” 
treatment, subjects are not allowed to disclose their states, are just randomly matched with another 
subject in a session, and play the public goods game in each period. This treatment serves as a 
control to identify the impact of information disclosure and/or sorting in the main treatments.  
Second, the “Mandatory” (“Mandatory Disclosure”) treatment will be used to identify the 
impact of exogenous information disclosure and to compare it against the impact of voluntary 
information disclosure in the C-Sorting treatment – the treatment which displayed the highest 
efficiency among the four main treatments (Section 4). At the onset of the Mandatory treatment, 
subjects are randomly assigned to a group of six and the group composition stays the same 
during the experiment.13 In each period, subjects are randomly matched with one another in their 
own group and play the two-player public goods game (Equation (1)). From period 2, each 
subject’s last period contribution amount is always automatically revealed to their partner.  
Lastly, the third control treatment is called the “C-Sorting-N” (Costly Sorting, No 
Disclosure) treatment. This treatment is identical to the C-Sorting treatment, except that the 
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 In this task, subjects are randomly assigned into groups of four and make two kinds of decisions in a linear public 
goods game with an MPCR of 0.4. The first decision is the conditional contribution decisions, as just explained. The 
second decision is unconditional contribution decisions (i.e., each subject decides how much to contribute to their 
group unconditionally). Once all subjects have made the two decisions, one subject is randomly selected as the one 
whose conditional schedule is used to calculate her contribution amount. For the remaining three subjects in the 
group, their unconditional contribution decisions are used for their contribution amounts (see online Appendix A). 
13
 This setup was selected because, as will be explained in Sections 4 and 5, two subgroups – one for disclosers and 
the other for non-disclosers – were formed, and the average subgroup size was six in the C-Sorting treatment (Fig. 
1). In addition, subjects’ mobility between the two subgroups was small in the C-Sorting treatment (Section 5.3).  
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information is not disclosed. Subjects experience two stages after period 1. In the first stage, they 
decide whether or not to pay one ECU. A player who pays (does not pay) the fee is called the 
“payer” (“non-payer”). Payers (Non-payers) are randomly matched with another payer (non-
payer). However, their last-period contributions are not revealed. The data for this treatment are 
used to study the relative importance of (a) the presence of a matching cost and (b) disclosed 
information in determining high performance in the C-Sorting treatment. Since this treatment is 
not directly related to the hypotheses of the paper, the results are relegated to Appendix E. 
2.3. Experimental Procedure 
A total of 26 sessions (16 for the four main treatments and ten for the control treatments) 
were conducted from August 2015 through August 2017. All participants were Durham 
University students. No students participated in more than one session. All the instructions were 
neutrally framed. Communication was prohibited during the entire experiment. Subjects were 
privately paid based on their accumulated ECUs (40 ECUs were exchanged for £1) at the end of 
the experiment.14 The average payment (including a show-up fee of £3) was £15.61. The average 
experiment duration (including reading instructions and paying subjects) was 90 minutes. 
3. Discussions on Subjects’ Possible Disclosure and Reputation Building 
 Standard theory, based on players’ self-interest and common knowledge of rationality, 
provides a point prediction because the MPCR is 0.8. Contributing zero to the joint account is a 
dominant strategy for each player in any period (∂i,t/∂ci,t < 0). Thus, by the logic of backward 
induction, each player would contribute nothing in every period under the assumption that they 
believe their peers would always contribute zero. Considering the peers’ full and uniform free-
riding behavior, no one would incur a cost to disclose their past in any period in the C-RM and C-
Sorting treatments. Disclosure decisions do not affect players’ payoffs in the F-RM and F-Sorting 
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 The session size was 12 in all sessions, except for one session in each of the C-Sorting, F-RM, F-Sorting, Baseline 
and C-Sorting-N treatments. For these sessions, the session size was eight.  
9 
treatments as these actions can be taken for free and the peers would always contribute zero; 
hence, players would randomly decide whether to disclose in these two treatments. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Standard theory prediction.  
(a) No one discloses their state (last-period contribution amount) in the C-RM and C- 
Sorting treatments. (b) Disclosure decisions are randomly made in the F-RM and F-Sorting 
treatments. (c) Subjects contribute nothing to the joint accounts in each period in all treatments. 
 
 In the absence of institutions to assist people’s contribution behaviors, a large body of 
experimental research partially supports Hypothesis 1(c). For example, although in earlier 
periods subjects may contribute around 40% to 60% of their endowment in a finitely repeated 
public goods game, they decrease their levels of cooperation steadily over time (Ledyard, 1995; 
Chaudhuri, 2011).15 With voluntary information disclosure, however, cooperation could evolve, 
similar to the logic of Kreps et al. (1982), if we assume that there exist players who choose to 
disclose and then act according to a conditional cooperation strategy (i.e., contribute conditional 
on partners doing so). The prevalence of conditional cooperators is well-documented (e.g., 
Fischbacher et al., 2001; Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010). Provided that there is a sufficiently 
large fraction of subjects who act following the conditional cooperation strategy, selfish free 
rider type i has incentives to strategically mimic the behavior of a conditional cooperator, and 
Hypothesis 2 can be derived (see Appendix B for the mathematical detail). Here, D(.) and C(.) 
refer to the disclosure rate and average contribution amount, respectively, in a given treatment. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Rational cooperation in the presence of conditional cooperators 
(a) Sorting improves cooperation: D(C-Sorting) > D(C-RM) and D(F-Sorting) > D(F-RM). 
Likewise, C(C-Sorting) > C(C-RM) and C(F-Sorting) > C(F-RM).  
(b) A disclosure cost does not discourage cooperation under random matching: C(F-RM) = C(C-
RM) while D(F-RM) ≥ D(C-RM). 
                                                          
15 Similar free-riding dynamics are reported when the group size is two, irrespective of whether partner or random 
matching is used (e.g., Kamei, 2019). 
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(c) Mandatory disclosure improves cooperation: C(Mandatory) > C(C-RM) = C(F-RM). 
 
An intuition behind Hypothesis 2(a) is that sorting increases the likelihood that free rider 
types interact with conditional cooperators if the former mimic the behavior of the latter. Past 
experiments suggest that endogenous regrouping encourages selfish types to strategically mimic 
cooperative types and achieve high efficiency (e.g., Page et al., 2005; Kamei and Putterman, 2017).  
Hypothesis 2(b) states that theoretically, the disclosure cost does not affect subjects’ 
contribution behavior under random matching, as the cost is too small: just one ECU. It is worth 
noting that this may not be correct behaviorally if subjects have a discontinuity in their 
cooperation tendency between free versus costly disclosure (e.g., Shampanier et al., 2007). 
Lastly, Kamei (2017) supports Hypothesis 2(c). Kamei (2017), in the context of a prisoner’s 
dilemma game, showed that: (i) given an option to hide IDs, a non-negligible fraction of individuals 
do not disclose their IDs and behave uncooperatively, even if mutual cooperation holds as an 
equilibrium outcome; and (ii) some subjects do not learn to disclose, even though disclosers 
continue to select defection against masked subjects. Such harmful hiding and uncooperative 
behaviors might be even stronger in the present study due to the finitely repeated setup.16 
4. Treatment Effects of Disclosure and Better Matching 
An overview of subjects’ decisions is given in Section 4.1. The treatment differences are 
examined in Section 4.2 and the material benefits of disclosing acts are investigated in Section 4.3.  
4.1. Overview of the Experiment   
First, the effect of exogenously disclosed information can be studied using the data of the 
Baseline and Mandatory treatments. Fig. 1 shows subjects’ average behaviors while dividing the 
                                                          
16 No clear prediction is possible for a comparison between the sorting versus the Mandatory treatments. The 
percentage of mimickers may be larger in the sorting than in the Mandatory treatment, considering that sorting 
assures a better matching among like-minded individuals. However, the opposite may also be possible if eliminating 
the option to hide encourages those who would hide and then behave uncooperatively in the sorting treatments to 
strategically build a reputation under mandatory disclosure. 
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data into the first half (periods 2-10) and the second half (periods 11-20) of the experiment.17,18 It 
suggests that groups achieve high efficiency if everyone is forced to disclose their state (panels 
(a) and (c)). The overall average contribution in the Mandatory treatment was about three times as 
large as in the Baseline treatment. A similar difference was also observed for subjects’ beliefs 
(panel (b)). The strong effect of mandatory disclosure on improving cooperation is consistent 
with the prior studies that found positive information effects in the contexts of a helping game 
(e.g., Bolton et al., 2005) and an investment game (e.g., Bolton et al., 2004).  
Fig. 1 further includes the data of the four main treatments. The majority of Hypothesis 2 
hold, although it does not perfectly explain the subjects’ behaviors. First, a non-negligible fraction 
of subjects chose to disclose their states, irrespective of whether disclosure was costly or free (see 
panel (d)).19 Consistent with Hypothesis 2(a), the disclosure rate (the percentage of the cases in 
which subjects chose to disclose) was higher with sorting than under random matching for a given 
disclosure cost, although it remained well below 100% even with sorting. Further, the presence of 
a positive disclosure cost undermined subjects’ disclosure rates.  
Second, voluntary information disclosure has a positive effect on improving cooperation, 
and accordingly payoff, in all the four treatments (panels (a) and (c)). As predicted by Hypothesis 
2(a), the positive effect was stronger with sorting than under random matching for a given 
disclosure cost. However, the difference between the F-RM and F-Sorting treatments was small.  
Third, the positive disclosure cost helped improve cooperation with sorting. This implies 
that a higher disclosure rate due to the lack of a disclosure cost is not helpful in improving 
cooperation. By clear contrast, the positive disclosure cost strongly undermined cooperation under 
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 The data from period 1 were excluded because subjects were not given an opportunity to disclose the state in that 
period in the treatments with information disclosure. Results are nevertheless similar even if all data including 
period 1 are used (the results are omitted to conserve space). 
18 Fig. 1 indicates that subjects’ average contributions, beliefs and payoffs were all on average lower in the second 
half than in the first half of every treatment, including these two control treatments. This is a natural end-game effect 
(Andreoni, 1988). The treatment differences were similarly observed regardless of which half of the data are used 
for a comparison.  See Appendix Fig. C.1 for subjects’ period-by-period decisions. 
19 Subjects correctly anticipated the peers’ disclosure behaviors in the C-RM and F-RM treatments (panel (d)). 
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random matching, unlike Hypothesis 2(b). The cost may have driven some cooperative types to 
non-disclosure and conservative behavior. This interpretation is consistent with the low disclosure 
rate result in the C-RM treatment (only 23.0% on average), which decreases the material 
incentives to mimic the behavior of a conditional cooperator. This implies that subjects may have 
a discontinuity in their reputation building behaviors between positive and zero costs (e.g., 
Shampanier et al., 2007).  
Fig. 1: Subjects’ Average Behaviors in the First and Second Halves of the Experiment 
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Subjects’ possible overreaction to the positive disclosure cost under random matching is 
also evident from the dynamics of their disclosure decisions. The subjects’ disclosure rate 
displayed a decreasing trend in the C-RM treatment, while it remained stable in the F-RM, C-
Sorting and F-Sorting treatments (Appendix Fig. C.1.I(c) and II(c), Fig. 1(d)). The trend in the C-
RM treatment may have occurred because disclosure involved a cost and no sorting mechanism 
was present. Thus, subjects might have gradually perceived that disclosure was not worth the cost. 
Lastly, the efficiency under mandatory disclosure was the highest in this study.  
4.2. Disclosure Behaviors and the Impact of Disclosed Information  
 The following studies the treatment differences using session-average observations (Table 
2).20 Consistent with the discussions in Section 4.1, the disclosure rates were significantly higher 
in the C-Sorting (F-Sorting) than in the C-RM (F-RM) treatment.21 In addition, the presence of a 
positive disclosure cost strongly influenced subjects’ decisions to disclose: the disclosure rates 
were significantly lower in the C-RM (C-Sorting) than in the F-RM (F-Sorting) treatment.   
 
Result 1: (i) Non-negligible fractions of subjects disclosed their states in all conditions. (ii) 
Subjects’ disclosure rates were significantly higher with sorting than under random matching for 
a given disclosure cost (whether costly or free). (iii) A positive disclosure cost significantly 
decreased subjects’ disclosure rates, whether random matching or sorting was used. 
 
The calculations also show that the impact of information disclosure on efficiency depends 
on the matching protocols. The impact is significant in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, but 
not in the C-RM and F-RM treatments (columns (2) and (4)).22 The effect of sorting, nevertheless, 
differs by the disclosure cost. First, the average contribution and payoff were both significantly 
larger in the C-Sorting than in the C-RM treatment. However, sorting had little impact on 
                                                          
20 The treatment differences were also studied based on a regression model using session-average observations. The 
results are similar, but have more significant differences (see Appendix Table C.1 for the detail). 
21 Subjects’ disclosure rates were significantly positive in all four treatments (column (1) of Appendix Table C.1). 
22
 The average contribution in the F-RM treatment is about double that in the Baseline treatment. However, the 
difference in the average contribution is not significant due to a high variance in the former treatment. The 
difference is significant if a regression method is used (column (2) of Appendix Table C.1). 
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efficiency when disclosure was free, despite Result 1(ii). For example, the average contribution 
was 7.48 ECUs in the F-RM treatment vs. 7.82 ECUs in the F-Sorting treatment.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 2(c), Table 2 also confirms the outperformance of mandatory 
disclosure under random matching. The efficiency, whether in contributions or payoffs, in the 
Mandatory treatment was significantly (weaker significantly) higher than in the C-RM (F-RM) 
treatment. Although the differences are not significant, the average contribution amounts were 
25.2% and 47.4% higher in the Mandatory treatment than in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting 
treatments, respectively.23 
Table 2. Treatment Differences in Subjects’ Behaviors  
 
Disclosure rates  
(1) 
Avg. contributions 
(2) 
Avg. beliefs 
(3) 
Avg. payoffs 
(4) 
     
A. Average subjects’ behaviors by treatment: 
 
  
(i) Baseline treatment n.a. 3.91 
[19.6%] 
3.99 
[20.0%] 
22.30 
(ii) C-RM treatment 23.0% 5.90 
[29.5%] 
5.87 
[29.4%] 
23.31 
(iii) C-Sorting treatment 52.8% 9.21 
[46.1%] 
9.76 
[48.8%] 
25.00 
(iv) F-RM treatment 53.9% 7.48 
[37.4%] 
6.97 
[34.8%] 
24.49 
(v) F-Sorting treatment 70.7% 7.82  
[39.1%] 
7.56 
[37.8%] 
24.69 
(vi) Mandatory treatment n.a. 11.53 
[57.7%] 
11.45 
[57.3%] 
26.92 
B. p-value (two-sided) for Mann-Whitney tests based session-average observations: 
H0: (i) = (ii) n.a. .3865 .2482 .3865 
H0: (i) = (iii) n.a. .0209** .0209** .0833* 
H0: (i) = (iv) n.a. .1489 .1489 .1489 
H0: (i) = (v) n.a. .0433** .0833* .0433** 
H0: (i) = (iv) n.a. .0433** .0209** .0433** 
H0: (ii) = (iii) .0209** .0209** .0209** .0209** 
H0: (ii) = (iv) .0209** .2482 .5637 .1489 
H0: (ii) = (v) .0209** .1489 .1489 .1489 
H0: (ii) = (vi) n.a. .0209** .0433** .0209** 
H0: (iii) = (iv) .5637 .1489 .0833* .5637 
H0: (iii) = (v) .0433** .2482 .0433** .7728 
H0: (iii) = (vi) n.a. .2482 .5637 .1489 
H0: (iv) = (v) .0433** .7728 .7728 .7728 
H0: (iv) = (vi) n.a. .0833* .0833* .0833* 
H0: (v) = (vi) n.a. .1489 .1489 .1489 
     
Notes: Averaged from period 2 to 20. The numbers in squared bracket in column (2) (column (3)) are average contributions 
(beliefs) as the percentages of endowments. Results are similar when the averages are calculated using all data including the one 
from period 1.  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
  
 
                                                          
23
 According to a regression analysis, the average contribution and payoff are both weakly significantly higher in the 
Mandatory than in the F-Sorting treatment. The average payoff is also weakly significantly higher in the Mandatory 
compared to in the C-Sorting treatment (Appendix Table C.1).  
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Result 2: (i) Information disclosure significantly improved efficiency (whether in contributions 
or payoffs) under sorting, but not under random matching. (ii) The average contribution and 
payoff were both significantly higher in the C-Sorting than in the C-RM treatment. (iii) 
Mandatory disclosure strongly improved efficiency. 
 4.3. Subjects’ Benefits of Disclosing Acts 
Theoretically, free riders have strategic incentives to build cooperative reputations under 
certain conditions (Section 3 and Appendix B). A close look at the data by disclosure decision 
reveals that disclosers contributed more strongly than non-disclosers in all four treatments (Fig. 
2(a)).24 However, this does not mean that subjects had incentives to build cooperative reputations 
in all four treatments. As shown in Fig. 2(b), there is a clear contrast regarding the material 
consequences of the disclosing acts between the matching protocols. In the C-RM and F-RM 
treatments, disclosers received on average lower payoffs than non-disclosers. The difference is 
significant for the F-RM treatment.25 This suggests that under random matching, disclosers’ 
intentions to cooperate or build reputations were exploited by non-disclosers. By sharp contrast, in 
the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, disclosers received on average higher payoffs than non-
disclosers.26,27 This underscores the role of sorting in making information disclosure materially 
beneficial and is consistent with the treatment differences summarized in Result 2(i).28  
                                                          
24
 This holds regardless of whether the data only from the first half (periods 2 to 10) or from the second half (periods 
11 to 20) are used. See Appendix Fig. C.4. 
25
 The lack of significance in the C-RM treatment is due to subjects’ low disclosure rates in the C-RM treatment. 
Non-disclosers were less frequently matched with disclosers in the C-RM than in the F-RM treatment. It should be 
noted, however, that the disclosure rate was more than 25% in the first half of the experiment, and as shown in 
Appendix Fig. C.4, the average payoff was then significantly larger at the 10% level for the non-disclosers than for 
the disclosers in the C-RM treatment. 
26
 This tendency was observed throughout the entire experiment in the F-Sorting treatment. By contrast, in the C-
Sorting treatment, this tendency was strong for the second half of the experiment (Appendix Fig. C.4). 
27 The disclosers’ average payoffs are not significantly different between the two sorting treatments because 
although disclosers in the C-Sorting treatment achieved stronger cooperative relationships with their peers than 
those in the F-Sorting treatment, the former needed to incur a cost for their disclosure. 
28
 Sorting increases the likelihood to be matched with someone who acts according to the conditional cooperation 
strategy, i.e., conditional cooperator or mimicker. The importance of the matching probability can be checked 
further using the data of the two random-matching treatments. As shown in Section D.1 of Appendix D, subjects’ 
average disclosure rates were significantly positively correlated with their beliefs regarding the peers’ disclosure 
rates. The subjects’ conditional disclosure behaviors resonate with the idea that subjects would positively respond to 
16 
 
Result 3: (i) The average contributions were higher for disclosers than for non-disclosers in all 
four treatments. (ii) The average payoffs were also higher for disclosers than for non-disclosers 
in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, but conversely, the payoffs were higher for non-
disclosers than for disclosers in the C-RM and F-RM treatments.29 
 
Fig. 2: Subjects’ Average Contributions and Payoffs by Disclosure Decision 
  
Notes: Each bar was calculated in the following two steps. First, the session-average contributions (payoffs) were calculated by 
disclosure decision. Next, they were averaged by treatment. Each two-sided p-value in panel (a) (panel (b)) is a Wald test result for 
the null that the average contributions (payoffs) are the same between disclosers and non-disclosers in a given treatment. The Wald 
test was performed based on the estimation results of subject random effect linear regressions with standard errors clustered by 
session. The average contributions and payoffs in the Baseline and Mandatory treatments in the figure were also calculated using 
data from periods 2 to 20. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
As explained in Section 2, the Mandatory treatment was constructed for a comparison with 
the C-Sorting treatment. Fig. 2(a) indicates that the average contribution of disclosers in the C-
Sorting treatment was almost the same as the average contribution in the Mandatory treatment, but 
that the average contribution of non-disclosers was much less. This suggests that people do 
                                                          
peers’ signals of future contributions, as have been observed in other contexts, including direct punishment (Kamei, 
2014), third party punishment (Kamei, forthcoming), and costly gossiping (Kamei and Putterman, 2018). 
29
 Readers may wonder whether the treatment differences seen in Results 1 and 2 can go through in the same way if 
subjects are given an opportunity to repeat the supergame (finitely repeated public goods game). Kamei and 
Putterman (2017) found that subjects would (would not) learn to cooperate from supergame to supergame when 
cooperating is (is not) materially beneficial based on the partners’ reciprocal responses. Result 3(ii) implies that the 
treatment differences between the two matching protocols may persist, or even widen, if subjects gain experiences. 
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cooperate if they are all forced to disclose, thus indicating that the mandatory disclosure system 
functions more effectively than the voluntary disclosure system since it eliminates the option to 
hide past behaviors. 
5. Subjects’ Disclosure Decisions and Action Choices 
 This section presents a detailed analysis of the subjects’ behaviors.  
5.1. Subjects’ Disclosure Decisions and Reputation States 
As discussed in Section 4.1 and Fig. 1(d), a non-negligible fraction of subjects did not 
disclose their reputation states (denoted as Si,t, hereafter). This was the case even with sorting, 
despite Result 3(ii). In order to investigate this behavioral pattern in greater depth, the relationship 
between subjects’ states and disclosure decisions was examined (Fig. 3). Three clear patterns 
emerged. First, a subject’s likelihood to disclose Si,t is monotonically increasing in the size of Si,t, 
whether disclosure is costly or free. This pattern, combined with Result 3(i), implies that a subject 
with a high (low) Si,t maintained a high (low) status over time, even though she could change her 
reputation status easily (recall that Si,t = ci,t-1).  
Second, consistent with Hypothesis 2(a), sorting nevertheless raised subjects’ disclosure 
rates for each category of Si,t except the highest. If Si,t  [17, 20], the average disclosure rate was 
94.5% even in the F-RM treatment.  
Third, the presence of a positive disclosure cost discouraged subjects from disclosing Si,t in 
both the sorting and random-matching conditions, for each category of Si,t (see Result 1(iii) also). 
 
Result 4: (i) Subjects’ disclosure rates were positively correlated with the size of own Si,t. (ii) 
Even when disclosure was free, subjects with low Si,t were reluctant to disclose their states. (iii) 
The impact of sorting and of positive disclosure cost occurred regardless of the size of Si,t.30 
 
In summary, the weak rational cooperation under random matching (Result 2(i), Result 
3(ii)), and the failure of information unraveling under sorting despite Result 3(ii), are due to some 
                                                          
30
 As shown in Appendix Fig. C.5, Result 4 holds irrespective of which half of the data (before period 11 or after 
period 10) are used. 
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subjects’ hiding and uncooperative behaviors. But, why did they not attempt to build cooperative 
reputations using the information disclosure system? It is possible that non-disclosers mistakenly 
believed that their matched partners would not be skeptical about their intentions to hide (Jin et al., 
2015). An alternative explanation is bounded rationality and insufficient levels of reasoning 
(Benndorf et al., 2015; Li and Schipper, 2018).31 
Fig. 3: Subjects’ Disclosure Rates by the Size of their State 
 
                   (a) The C-RM treatment                                             (b) The F-RM treatment 
 
                 (c) The C-Sorting treatment                                     (d) The F-Sorting treatment 
 
                                                          
31
 A regression analysis was conducted to explore whether it is possible to rationalize the subjects’ behaviors with 
pecuniary considerations alone. It was found that in all treatments, (i) subjects’ contribution amounts were positively 
correlated with their beliefs on peers’ contribution behaviors and (ii) the beliefs were significantly positively 
correlated with the partners’ states when these were observable. In the C-RM and F-RM treatments, in addition, 
subjects believed that non-disclosers’ contribution behaviors would be the same as those of disclosers whose states 
Si,t were zero. The estimation results suggest that some subjects did not disclose even though disclosing the states 
was a materially beneficial action. The details are included in Section D.2 in Appendix D.  
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5.2. Cooperation Types and their Attempts to Strategically Build Reputation 
The following considers how subjects’ disclosure and contribution behaviors differ by 
cooperation type. As detailed below, the analysis reveals that (a) some selfish subjects 
strategically contributed positive amounts for future disclosure in line with the idea that they were 
mimicking the behaviors of conditional cooperators, but (b) not all conditional cooperators 
behaved cooperatively.  
The conditional contribution schedule (Fischbacher et al., 2001) elicited from each subject 
can be used for this analysis,32 while focusing on two types: “conditional cooperators” and “free 
riders.”33 Similar to Fischbacher et al., those whose own contributions were significantly 
positively correlated with the others’ average contributions at least at the 5% level (according to 
spearman’s ρ) are defined as the conditional cooperators. Those whose own contributions are 
always zero in the task are defined as free riders.34 The percentages of conditional cooperators and 
free riders who disclosed their states in the C-RM (F-RM) treatment are on average 25.8% 
(55.3%) and 21.1% (50.3%), respectively. These two percentages in the C-Sorting (F-Sorting) 
treatment are 46.7% (70.6%) and 66.4% (65.8%), respectively. Thus, a non-negligible fraction of 
free riders did disclose their states, whereas not every conditional cooperator disclosed their state.  
The fit of the Fischbacher et al.’s (2001) method can be checked by examining subjects’ 
contribution amounts in period 20. A subject would contribute nothing in period 20 if she is 
purely selfish. The data show that free riders contributed much less in period 20 than conditional 
cooperators did, whether they disclosed the states or not (each panel (b) of Fig. 4). This implies 
that the classified types are good indicators to measure subjects’ contribution behaviors.  
The data by the type reveal that not only conditional cooperators but also free riders  
                                                          
32
 The average conditional contribution schedule exhibits that of a conditional cooperator (Appendix Fig. C.3). 
33
 Fischbacher et al. (2001) found a type called the “hump-shared contributor.” Some subjects in this study also 
exhibited this pattern. However, only around 8.3% of subjects were classified as hump-shaped. 
34
 58.3% (63.6%) and 12.5% (20.5%) of the subjects were classified as conditional cooperators and free riders, 
respectively, in the C-RM (F-RM) treatment. 50.0% (59.1%) and 18.2% (18.2%) of subjects were classified as 
conditional cooperators and free riders, respectively, in the C-Sorting (F-Sorting) treatment. 
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Fig. 4: Average Contribution Amounts by Disclosure Decision 
  
                                        (1) The C-RM treatment                                                                                          (2) The F-RM treatment 
 
                                     (3) The C-Sorting treatment                                                                                       (4) The F-Sorting treatment 
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contributed similarly large amounts in each treatment before period 20 (each panel (a) of Fig. 4). 
This suggests that, whether the attempts were successful or not, some free riders mimicked the 
behavior of a conditional cooperator by contributing large amounts and disclosing them in the 
following periods. 
 
Result 5: (i) Free riders contributed very little in period 20, unlike conditional cooperators. (ii) 
However, the free riders contributed almost the same amounts as the conditional cooperators in 
periods before period 20. 
 
One may wonder why some conditional cooperators did not disclose their states. One 
possibility is that they were pessimistic about their peers’ behaviors. As shown in Appendix Fig. 
D.2, conditional cooperators who less frequently disclosed their states formed lower beliefs 
about their matched peers’ contribution behaviors, compared with the same types who frequently 
disclosed.40 However, this is suggestive evidence only because the subjects’ average beliefs do 
not differ significantly by the frequency of disclosure (also see Appendix Table D.2).  
 In the C-RM and F-RM treatments, disclosers were not assured to be matched with another 
discloser. Both conditional cooperators and free riders who disclosed their states contributed 
larger amounts when matched with disclosers rather than non-disclosers, but they still contributed 
large amounts even toward non-disclosers (Appendix Fig. C.6). This can be explained by the 
unmasked subjects’ attempts to maintain high reputation scores (Si,t+1 is solely dependent on i’s 
contribution amount in period t). Interestingly, both cooperation types contributed larger amounts 
towards disclosers, even when they hid their states (each panel (b) of Fig. C.6). If we accept that 
free riders are strategically minded, this behavior by masked free riders may have been driven by 
an attempt to not discourage disclosers’ willingness to contribute for future exploitative purposes. 
5.3. Performance Differences between the C-Sorting and F-Sorting Treatments  
Sorting had a positive effect on efficiency only when disclosure was costly (Fig. 1, Table 2,  
                                                          
35
 It should be noted that the direction of causality may be the opposite: subjects’ beliefs on the disclosers’ strong 
contribution behaviors may have been formed by their experiences. 
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Result 2(ii)). This subsection studies the difference between the two sorting treatments in details. 
Appendix Fig. C.7 reports the subject-by-subject average contribution amounts when they 
chose to disclose the states. This shows that most subjects frequently switched back and forth 
between disclosing and not disclosing. However, more subjects selected to disclose frequently in 
the F-Sorting than in the C-Sorting treatment. Appendix Fig. C.8 reports the history of disclosure 
decisions, subject by subject. Unlike in the C-Sorting treatment, most subjects in the F-Sorting 
treatment switched back and forth between disclosing and hiding with different cycles.36 The 
percentages of subjects who disclosed more than or equal to ten times (except period 20) – 
“frequent disclosers” hereafter – are 52.3% and 77.3% in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, 
respectively.37 Fig. C.7 also indicates that a larger percentage of the frequent disclosers contributed 
small amounts in the F-Sorting than in the C-Sorting treatment.38 These findings suggest that the 
presence of a positive disclosure cost effectively discouraged those who had intentions to exploit 
high contributors from disclosing their states. This implies that the positive effect of voluntary 
disclosure through better matching may not be large if disclosure is free.39  
 
Result 6: A significantly larger percentage of disclosers attempted to exploit high contributors 
in the F-Sorting than in the C-Sorting treatment. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study demonstrated that given an option to disclose the past, a non-negligible fraction 
of individuals do disclose their past action choices and that voluntary information disclosure helps 
                                                          
36 Disclosers in period t – 1 in the C-Sorting treatment were more likely to stay as a discloser in period t, compared 
with those in the F-Sorting treatment (Remark in Appendix Fig. C.8). Non-disclosers in the C-Sorting treatment did 
not switch to being a discloser in the following period when they contributed large amounts (Appendix Table C.3). 
37
 The two percentages are significantly different (two-sample test of proportions, two-sided p-value = .0141). 
38
 The percentages of the frequent disclosers who contributed less than 10 ECUs are 11.4% and 43.2% in the C-
Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, respectively. The two percentages are significantly different (two-sided p = .0107). 
39
 As discussed in Section 2.2, the C-Sorting treatment has two components (A) disclosed information and (B) the 
cost to be matched with like-minded others. Component (B) is absent in the F-Sorting treatment. It could be 
considered that if the presence of a positive disclosure cost is the most important factor for the superior performance 
of the C-Sorting treatment, then the disclosers’ benefits may remain high even if the element of disclosed 
information is eliminated from the C-Sorting treatment. The additional data from the C-Sorting-N treatment revealed 
that having a positive disclosure cost in fact generates an effect; however, the presence of disclosed information is 
crucial for performance in the C-Sorting treatment; see Appendix E for details. 
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strengthen cooperation. However, individuals were significantly deterred from disclosing if 
disclosure did not ensure being matched with another discloser, or if it involved a cost, even a 
small cost. The latter finding is surprising, considering the small size of the disclosure cost 
involved – only 1 ECU (2.5 pence). This may mean that there is a discontinuity in people’s 
disclosure behaviors between zero and positive costs.  
Nevertheless, costly information disclosure did support the evolution of cooperation when 
disclosers were assured to be matched with another discloser. This result supports past empirical 
research that emphasizes the role of sorting in sequential-move interactions (e.g., Tadelis and 
Zettelmeyer, 2015). This being said, the efficiency of the system as a whole under costly disclosure 
may be worse than that under mandatory disclosure, because (a) a sizable fraction of subjects 
conceal their states and behave uncooperatively and (b) disclosers need to incur a private cost. 
Aspect (a) may be caused by subjects’ limited cognitive ability. For example, Li and Schipper 
(2018), in the context of a sequential-move sender-responder game, discussed that high levels of 
reasoning and cognitive abilities are required for first-movers in the persuasion game to recognize 
the benefits of quality disclosure. This argument also reinforces this study’s conclusion that 
mandatory disclosure is superior, since it decreases subjects’ cognitive loads. What players need to 
evaluate in the mandatory system is only the peers’ responses to the value of their own states. 
Then, what may encourage those with less cognitive loads to voluntarily disclose their past 
behaviors and behave cooperatively? An exploration of mechanisms to further improve the costly 
information disclosure system remains an interesting avenue for future research. 
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Appendix A: Some Experimental Procedure and Instructions 
The experiment except the instructions was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 
2007). The instructions were neutrally framed. Eligible subjects were sent solicitation messages 
via ORSEE developed by Greiner (2015); and subjects voluntarily registered for and participated 
in the experiment.  
References:  
Fischbacher, U. “z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic Experiments.” 
Experimental Economics, Vol. 10 (2007), pp. 171-178. 
Greiner, B. “Subject pool recruitment procedures: organizing experiments with ORSEE.” 
Journal of Economic Science Association, Vol. 1 (2015), pp. 114-125.  
This part of the Appendix includes instructions for the C-Sorting treatment as an example. 
[The following instructions were read aloud at the onset of the experiment:] 
Instructions 
You are now taking part in a decision-making experiment. Depending on your decisions and the 
decisions of other participants, you will be able to earn money in addition to the £3 guaranteed 
for your participation. Please read the following instructions carefully. 
   
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other participants. If you have 
questions, raise your hand. One of us will come to answer your question. 
   
During the experiment your earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the experiment 
your points will be converted to U.K. pounds at the following rate: 
 
40 points = £1 
 
(or each point will be exchanged for 2.5 pence of real money). At the end of the experiment your 
total earnings (including the £3 participation fee) will be paid out to you in cash. Your payment 
will be rounded to the nearest 10 pence (e.g., £15.30 if it is £15.33; and £15.40 if it is £15.37). 
 
This experiment consists of two parts. We will first explain the detail of Part 1. We will 
distribute the instruction for Part 2 once Part 1 is over. 
 
PART 1 
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At the beginning of Part 1, you are randomly assigned to a group of four and interact with each 
other. In this part, you and your three group members are each given an endowment of 20 
points and simultaneously make two kinds of allocation decisions. There are two accounts to 
allocate: private account and group account. Specifically, you are asked how many points you 
want to allocate to the group account. The remaining points (that is, 20 minus your allocation to 
the group account) will be automatically allocated to your private account. Your earnings in this 
part depend on (a) the number of points in your private account and (b) total allocation 
amounts to your group account. 
   
You are asked to make the following two decisions in order. We will first explain these two 
decisions. We will then explain how your earnings are determined. 
   
The first decision: conditional allocation decisions 
   
You are asked how many points you want to allocate to your group account, contingent on 
average allocations of the three other members in your group. Specifically, you are asked to 
make 21 conditional decisions by completing the form shown below: 
 
For instance, in the top box, you will input how many points you want to allocate to your group 
account if the other three members on average allocate 0 points to your group account. Likewise, 
in the bottom box, you will answer how many points you want to allocate to your group account 
if the other three members on average allocate 20 points to your group account. Answering each 
question is mandatory. Your response to each question must be an integer between 0 and 20. 
 
4 
 
The second decision: unconditional allocation decisions 
   
Once all participants complete the conditional allocation schedules, you will be subsequently 
asked to make unconditional allocation decisions to their group accounts. 
 
How to calculate your earnings: 
First, both of your conditional and unconditional allocation decisions may affect your earnings. 
Once all individuals in your group make their unconditional allocation decisions, one out of the 
four group members is randomly selected and the selected member’s allocation points to the 
group account will be calculated based on his or her conditional allocation schedule. As for the 
other three participants in the group, their unconditional allocation decisions will be used. Note 
that in calculating the selected member’s allocation points, the other three members’ average 
allocation amount is rounded to the nearest integer (e.g., 4 if it is 3.5; 10 if it is 10.4). 
   
For example, suppose that you were randomly chosen as the one whose conditional allocation 
schedule will be used. Also, suppose that the three other members in your group unconditionally 
allocated 5 points, 11 points and 8 points, respectively, to the group account. Then, the average 
allocation amount of the three members is calculated as 8 points (= (5 + 11 + 8)/3). Suppose that 
you indicated that you would allocate 10 points if the others on average allocated 8 points to 
your group account. Then, your allocation amount in Part 1 would be 10 points. 
 
Your earnings in this part are calculated as in the following formula: 
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(sum of points in your private account) + 0.4  (sum of points allocated by you and your 
group members to the group account)    
 
In other words, your earnings from your private account are equal to the number of points you 
allocated to the private account (20 minus your allocation to your group account). The points 
you allocate to your private account do not affect the earnings of your group members.  
 
By contrast, your earnings from the group account equal the sum of points allocated to the group 
account by you and your three group members multiplied by 0.4. In other words, when you 
allocate 1 point to the group account, you and your three peers each get 0.4 (= 1 × .4) points 
as earnings. Thus, the total earnings in this case are 1.6 points, which is greater than 1 point. 
Note that you also obtain earnings of 0.4 points for each point your group member allocates to 
your group account. 
 
You will be informed of the interaction outcomes and earnings of Part 1 after Part 2 is over. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. When all questions are answered, we will 
move on to comprehension questions. 
 
Comprehension questions 
Please answer the following questions.  Raise your hand if you need help.   
 
1. Suppose that all four members in your group allocate 0 points to the group account. How 
much does each member earn? _______________ 
 
2. Suppose that all four members in your group allocate 20 points to the group account. How 
much does each member earn? _______________ 
 
3. Suppose that the other three members in your group in total allocate 30 points to the group. 
Answer the following: 
 
a) How much do you earn if you allocate 0 points to the group account? _______________ 
  
b) How much do you earn if you allocate 10 points to the group account? _______________ 
 
c) How much do you earn if you allocate 20 points to the group account? _______________ 
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[Once everyone finished answering the comprehension questions in Part 1 and the experimenter 
explained the answers, Part 1 began. Once Part 1 was over, the following instructions were 
distributed and were read aloud:] 
 
PART 2 
 
In this part, you will be paired and interact with another participant in each period. The 
number of interactions in Part 2 is 20. At the beginning of each period, you are given an 
endowment of 20 points and make a decision using the endowment. You will be paid based on 
your accumulated earnings at the end of the experiment (the conversion rate is 40 points = £1 as 
in Part 1). 
 
Each period after period 1 consists of two stages. (Period 1 consists of only one stage.) We will 
first explain the nature of your interactions in each period. We will then explain how your 
partner is assigned to you. 
 
Your interactions in each period: 
 
You and your assigned counterpart will be each given an endowment of 20 points in every 
period.  You and your partner then simultaneously decide how to use the endowment. There are 
two accounts for this purpose: private account and joint account. You will be asked how many 
points you want to allocate to your joint account. The remaining points will automatically be 
allocated to your private account.  
 
Your earnings in a given period depend on (a) the number of points in your private account 
and (b) the total number of points in the joint account. 
 
How to calculate your earnings: 
 
Your earnings from your private account are equal to the number of points allocated to the 
private account. That is, for example, if there are 5 points in your private account, you get 5 
points as earnings. The points you allocate to your private account do not affect the earnings of 
your counterpart.  
 
Your earnings from the joint account equal the sum of points allocated to the joint account by 
you and your counterpart multiplied by 0.8. In other words, when you allocate 1 point to the 
joint account, you and your partner each get 0.8 (= 1 × .8) points as earnings. For example, 
suppose that you decide to allocate 5 points to the joint account. Also suppose that your 
counterpart decides to allocate 9 points to the joint account. In this case, the sum of points in the 
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joint account is 14 (= 5 + 9). The earnings of you and your counterpart from the joint account are 
equal to 11.2 (= 14  0.8) points.  
 
In summary, your earnings in a given period are calculated with the following formula: 
 
(sum of points in your private account) + 0.8  (sum of points allocated by you and your 
counterpart to the joint account)    
 
Note that you get 1 point as earnings when you allocate 1 point to your private account. If you 
instead allocate 1 point to your joint account, your earnings from your allocation is 0.8  1 = 0.8 
points. However, by allocating 1 point to the joint account, the earnings of your counterpart also 
increase by 0.8 points. Therefore, the total pair earnings are 0.8  2 = 1.6 points, which is greater 
than 1 point. Note that you also obtain earnings from points allocated to the joint account by your 
counterpart. You obtain 0.8  1 = 0.8 points for each point your pair partner allocates to your 
joint account. 
 
How is your partner assigned to you in each period? 
      
At the onset of each period, all participants simultaneously decide whether to disclose how 
much they allocated to their joint account in the last period by paying 1 point. If you decide 
to disclose it, 1 point will be deducted from your given period’s earnings.  
 
Each person that chose to disclose will be randomly matched with another person that decided 
to disclose. His or her allocation amount to the joint account in the last period is then 
informed to his or her partner before the partner makes an allocation decision.  If the 
number of those who chose to disclose their last-period allocation amounts is an odd number, 
then one of them will be randomly matched with a person that chose not to disclose his or her 
last-period allocation. Except the one person, each person that decided to disclose is assured that 
they will be matched with another person that chose to disclose. 
 
Likewise, each person that decided not to disclose his or her allocation amount to the joint 
account in the last period will be randomly matched with another person that likewise chose 
not to disclose. If the number of those who did not disclose their last-period allocation amount is 
an odd number, then one of them will be randomly matched with a person that chose to disclose 
his or her last-period allocation amount. Except the one person, each person that decided not to 
disclose is assured that they will be randomly matched with another person that decided not to 
disclose. 
      
There is no disclosing decision for you to make in period 1 since there is no previous period in 
period 1. Each participant is randomly matched with another participant in that period in the 
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today’s experiment. In period 2, you decide whether to disclose your first period allocation 
amount which costs you 1 point; and your matching is determined based on your disclosure 
decision and the computer’s random choices as explained above. 
       
Once this matching process in a given period is completed, you will move on to the allocation 
decisions as already described above.  
    
Summary:   
 
In period 1, you will be randomly matched with one of other participants, are given an 
endowment of 20 points, and make an allocation decision between your private account and the 
joint account. Your allocation decision and your counterpart’s allocation decision determine your 
earnings in period 1. 
 
In each period after period 1, you have two stages. 
     
Stage 1: All participants simultaneously decide whether to disclose how much they allocated to 
their joint accounts in the last period by paying 1 point. Each participant that decided to disclose 
his or her last-period allocation will be randomly matched with another that also decided to 
disclose his or her last-period allocation amount. Likewise, each participant that decided not to 
disclose his or her last-period allocation amount is randomly matched with another participant 
that also decided not to disclose his or her last-period allocation amount. 
 
Stage 2: Both you and your counterpart simultaneously make allocation decisions using the 
assigned endowment of 20 points. Your earnings in a given period are determined by your and 
your counterpart’s allocation decisions. 
 
You are privately paid based on your accumulated earnings immediately after the experiment is 
over. 
 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. When all questions are answered, we will 
move on to comprehension questions. 
 
Comprehension questions 
 
Please answer the following questions.  Raise your hand if you need help.   
 
1. How many periods do you have in Part 2? ________________ 
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2. How many points are deducted from your earnings at the end of a period if you decide to 
disclose your last-period allocation decision to your partner in that period? ________________ 
How many points are deducted from your earnings at the end of a period if you decide not to 
disclose your last-period allocation decision? ________________ 
 
3. Suppose that both you and your counterpart allocate 0 points to the joint account in a given 
period. 
 
a) How much do you earn? _______________ 
 
b) How much does your counterpart earn? _______________ 
 
4. Suppose that both you and your counterpart allocate 20 points to the joint account in a given 
period. 
 
a) How much do you earn? _______________ 
 
b) How much does your counterpart earn?  _______________ 
 
5. Suppose that your counterpart allocates 10 points to the joint account in a given period. 
Answer the following: 
 
a) How much do you earn if you allocate 0 points to the joint account? _______________ 
  
b) How much do you earn if you allocate 10 points to the joint account? _______________ 
 
c) How much do you earn if you allocate 20 points to the joint account? _______________ 
 
Any questions?  
 
[Once everyone finished answering the comprehension questions and the experimenter explained 
the answers, Part 2 started.] 
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Appendix B: Theoretical Calculations 
 Unlike Hypothesis 1 of the paper, cooperation could evolve with voluntary information 
disclosure. In the framework used in this study, a typical example of a non-selfish discriminating 
strategy is the ‘conditional cooperation strategy’ (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001).2 The prevalence 
of conditional cooperators (i.e., players who follow the conditional cooperation strategy) is well-
documented. In the theoretical analysis, for simplicity, assume that a conditional cooperator m 
contributes x∙Sj,t, where x(0,1], in period t if her matched partner j’s state (last-period 
contribution) is Sj,t = cj,t-1 and it is observable; m contributes zero if the state is not observable.3 
The steady decline of contributions in a finitely repeated dilemma game with no institutions can 
then be interpreted as a phenomenon that emerges when conditional cooperators are discouraged 
from cooperating after witnessing selfish types free ride (e.g., Fischbacher and Gächter, 2010).  
The following discusses the possibility of rational cooperation by examining the optimal 
behavior of a strategic free rider type i, assuming that there exist players who choose to disclose 
and then act according to the conditional cooperation strategy discussed above, in addition to the 
other free rider types. pcc100% and pFR100% are used to refer to the percentages of the 
conditional cooperators and the free riders, respectively (pcc + pFR = 1). Also, assume that 
pm,k100% of the free rider types mimic the behavior of a conditional cooperator ((1 – pm,k) 
100% of the free rider types contribute zero unconditionally) in treatment k. Hereafter, 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑅𝑀 , 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆  and 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑀  are used to refer to pm,k under random matching, sorting, and mandatory 
disclosure, respectively. Further, assume that x = 1 (perfect conditional cooperator) for 
simplicity.4 In this illustrative framework, we can show that it is materially beneficial for i to 
mimic the behavior of a conditional cooperator if there is a sufficiently large fraction of 
conditional cooperators and mimickers in the community where disclosers operate. The detail is 
provided in Sections B.1 and B.2. This prediction can be derived by setting up a Hamiltonian and 
applying the Maximum principle to it (e.g., Sethi and Thompson, 2006). 
 
Proposition B.1: If the percentage of persons who act according to the conditional cooperation 
strategy (i.e., conditional cooperators or mimickers) in the community where disclosers operate, 
denoted as “p”, is sufficiently large that p
 
> 0.25, then: in all periods before period 20, i 
contributes the full endowment and then discloses the state; in the end period (period 20), i 
                                                          
2
 Such conditional behaviors can be rationalized, for example, by assuming that players are concerned about inequity 
(e.g., Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or intention-based reciprocity (e.g., Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). 
3 In sealed-bid auctions with sellers’ voluntary disclosure of product quality, Forsythe et al. (1989) concluded that a 
sequential equilibrium in which buyers pessimistically believe that the worst scenario would happen for the blind 
bid explains subjects’ behaviors the most accurately. The assumption that conditional cooperators contribute zero if 
they encounter non-disclosers is similar to the “assume-the-worst strategy” employed by the subjects in Forsythe et 
al. (1989) because the “worst” partner in the present study is someone who contributes nothing. 
4 The basic implication for a strategic free rider’s behaviors does not change even if x < 1 is assumed. In this 
theoretical analysis, it is also assumed that each discloser (non-discloser) is randomly matched with another 
discloser (non-discloser) always under the sorting condition for simplicity.  
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discloses the state and then selects ci,20 = 0. If p < 0.25, the prediction is the same as Hypothesis 1 
of the paper.  
The treatment differences depend on assumptions. Assume that the free riders who do not 
mimic make disclosure decisions stochastically with a probability of yk in treatment k. Lastly, 
suppose that i correctly anticipates her peers’ behaviors and her beliefs on pcc, pm,k and yk are 
correct. Under these assumptions, p in Proposition B.1 is calculated as follows:  
 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑐𝑐 + 𝑝𝐹𝑅 ∙ 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑅𝑀 ≡ 𝑝𝑅𝑀 for both the C-RM and F-RM treatments.  𝑝 = 𝑝𝑐𝑐+𝑝𝐹𝑅∙𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆𝑝𝑐𝑐+𝑝𝐹𝑅∙𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆 +𝑦𝑘∙𝑝𝐹𝑅∙(1−𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆 ) ≡ 𝑝𝑆 for the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments. 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑐𝑐 + 𝑝𝐹𝑅 ∙ 𝑝𝑚,𝑀𝑀 ≡ 𝑝𝑀 for the Mandatory treatment.  
 
Here, we can reasonably assume that 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑅𝑀  is the same for the C-RM and F-RM treatments since 
the disclosure cost is too small to affect i’s mimicking incentives (see the mathematical 
calculations summarized in Section B.1). Since past experimental studies suggest that 
endogenous regrouping or partner choice encourages selfish types to mimic cooperative types, it 
can also be assumed that 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆 > 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑅𝑀  for a given disclosure cost. 
Condition (A) and Proposition B.1 suggest three behavioral patterns. First, i’s incentives to 
build a cooperative reputation would be stronger with than without sorting.5 Second, the disclosure 
cost does not affect subjects’ contribution behavior under random matching, as the cost is too small: 
just one ECU.6 Third, mandatory disclosure would improve cooperation, compared with random 
matching, because prior research suggests that 𝑝𝑚,𝑀𝑀 > 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑅𝑀  (and thus 𝑝𝑀 > 𝑝𝑅𝑀). Kamei (2017), 
in the context of an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game, showed that: (i) given an option 
to hide IDs, a non-negligible fraction of individuals do not disclose their IDs and behave 
uncooperatively, even if mutual cooperation holds as an equilibrium outcome; and (ii) some 
subjects do not learn to disclose, even though disclosers continue to select defection against masked 
subjects. Such hiding and uncooperative behaviors might be even stronger in the present study due 
to the finitely repeated setup. Kamei (2017) also showed that eliminating the option to hide would 
increase the number of mimickers. These considerations can be summarized as in Hypothesis 2 of 
the paper. It is noted here that no clear prediction is possible for a comparison between the sorting 
treatments versus the Mandatory treatment. 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆  may be larger than 𝑝𝑚,𝑀𝑀  considering that sorting 
assures a better matching among like-minded individuals. However, the opposite (𝑝𝑚,𝑀𝑀 > 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆 ) 
may also be possible if eliminating the option to hide encourages those who would hide and then 
                                                          
5
 𝑝𝑆 − 𝑝𝑅𝑀 = 𝑝𝑐𝑐+𝑝𝐹𝑅∙𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆𝑝𝑐𝑐+𝑝𝐹𝑅∙𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆 +𝑦𝑘∙𝑝𝐹𝑅∙(1−𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆 )− (𝑝𝑐𝑐 + 𝑝𝐹𝑅 ∙ 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑅𝑀 ) ≥ (𝑝𝑐𝑐 + 𝑝𝐹𝑅 ∙ 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑅𝑀 ) [ 1𝑝𝑐𝑐+𝑝𝐹𝑅∙𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆 +𝑦𝑘∙𝑝𝐹𝑅∙(1−𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆 )− 1] ≥ 0. 
6
 A positive disclosure cost may raise the mimicking incentives under sorting if the cost deters some opportunistic 
types from invading the set of disclosers. As an anonymous referee pointed out, however, the impact of cost depends 
on assumptions regarding free riders’ mimicking behaviors (a full characterization of equilibrium without imposing 
assumptions is desirable). A rigorous theoretical analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.  
(A) 
12 
 
behave uncooperatively in the sorting treatments to strategically build a reputation under mandatory 
disclosure. 
The rest of Appendix B provides calculation results. It first explains a strategic selfish 
free rider i’s optimal control, assuming that all free riders other than i do not mimic the behavior 
of a conditional cooperator (Section B.1). It will then explain i’s optimal control when some 
other free riders also pretend to be a conditional cooperator (Section B.2). 
 
B.1. When no free riders other than i are mimickers 
Notation: 
pcc100: the percentage of conditional cooperators (those who disclose last-period 
contribution amounts and then act according to the conditional cooperation strategy) 
pFR100: the percentage of free riders other than i (those who contribute 0 unconditionally) 
f: disclosure cost (= 1 in the C-RM and C-Sorting treatments; = 0 in the F-RM and F-Sorting 
treatments) 
λ
 i,t+1: the shadow price of a unit of the reputation state in period t + 1 
Assumption: yk100% of free rider types disclose their states (although they contribute zero) in 
the treatment k  {C-RM, F-RM, C-Sorting, F-Sorting}. 
* Note that having unmasked free riders would not affect calculation results under random 
matching, because of the assumption that conditional cooperators contribute zero towards 
disclosers whose states are zero, but it would decrease the value of information disclosure under 
sorting. The disclosure behavior suggested by Hypothesis 1 of the paper (standard theory 
prediction) means yC-RM = yC-Sorting = 0 and yF-RM = yF-Sorting = 0.5. 
As summarized below, calculations indicate the following treatment differences: 
 Provided that there is a sufficiently large percentage of conditional cooperators, the 
presence of a disclosure cost does not affect subjects’ decisions to build cooperative 
reputations, because the disclosure cost is sufficiently small (1 ECU). Further, the 
threshold percentage of conditional cooperator, 𝑝𝑐𝑐, above which i mimics the behavior 
of a conditional cooperator is also small. For example, 𝑝𝑐𝑐= .25 in the C-RM and F-RM 
treatments. 
 Suppose that there is a sufficiently large fraction of conditional cooperators. Free rider i 
then selects to disclose her state and always selects a contribution level of 20 until period 
19 (i.e., the Bang-bang solution). 
 Subjects’ average contribution amounts are higher in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting than in 
the C-RM and F-RM treatments, respectively, because each discloser is assured to be 
matched with another discloser under the sorting condition. 
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 Subjects’ contribution behaviors in the Mandatory treatment are the same as those in the 
C-RM and F-RM treatments. 
B.1.1. C-RM and F-RM treatments 
Assume that every subject has a reputation score of c0 (initial expected reputation score) in 
period 1 since they are not given an option to disclose in that period. This assumption means that 
conditional cooperators contribute S1 = c0 (while free riders contribute zero) in period 1. A 
Hamiltonian function can then be set up as in (#0): 
Ht,i = 20 – ci,t + r∙(ci,t + [pcc∙S1 + (1 – pcc)∙0]) + λi,t+1∙∆Si,1, for t = 1. 
Ht,i = 20 – ci,t + r∙(ci,t + pcc∙Si,t∙1disclose,i,t) – f∙1disclose,t + λi,t+1∙∆Si,t, for t > 1. 
This control problem for i is written as:  max(𝑐𝑖,𝑡)𝑡≤20{𝐽 = ∑ [𝜋(𝑖, 𝑡) = 𝐻𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜆𝑖,𝑡+1Δ𝑆𝑖,𝑡20𝑡=1 ]}, subject to: 
∆Si,t = Si,t+1 – Si,t = ci,t – Si,t for t = 1, 2, …, 20; Si,1 = S1. 
Under this setup, the adjoint equation can be written as below:  
 For t = 2, …, 20, ∆λi,t = λi,t+1 – λi,t = –Ht,i/Si,t = – pcc∙r∙1disclose,t –λi,t+1∙(–1). In other 
words,  
λi,t = pcc∙r∙1disclose,t. 
 For t = 21, λi,21 = π(i,21)/Si,20 = 0 (notice that there is no period 21 in the 
experiment).  
The optimal control for {𝑐𝑖,𝑡}𝑡≤20 is a bang-bang control, because Ht,i/ci,t = –1 + r + λi,t+1 does 
not depend on ci,t. Specifically, from the above adjoint equations, there are two cases: 
 When t < 20, Ht,i/ci,t = –1 + r + λt+1 = –1 + r + pcc∙r∙1disclose,t+1. This means that ci,t = 
20 if r + pcc∙r∙1disclose,t+1 > 1. Since r = .8, this inequality reduces to: pcc∙1disclose,t+1 
> .25. By contrast, ci,t = 0 if –1 + r + pcc∙r∙1disclose,t+1 < 0, or pcc∙1disclose,t+1 < .25.  
 
 When t = 20, Ht,i/ci,t = –1 + r, which is negative always. Thus, ci,20 = 0. 
The optimal disclosure decision of subject i is dependent on Si,t. Equation (#0) suggests that:  
 i discloses (does not disclose) Si,t if Si,t > (<) f/(pcc∙r) = 1.25/pcc; i randomly decides 
whether to disclose the state if Si,t = 1.25/pcc, in the C-RM treatment;  
 i discloses (randomly decides whether to disclose) Si,t if Si,t ≠ 0 (Si,t = 0) in the F-RM 
treatment.  
(#0) 
(#1) 
(#2) 
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These analyses suggest that in the F-RM treatment, subject i always discloses and contributes 20 
so long as pcc > .25 until period 19; and then i contributes zero in period 20. By contrast, if pcc 
< .25, i always contributes zero and randomly decides whether to disclose in each period. 
Because the disclosure cost is just one ECU, subjects’ reputation building behaviors in the C-RM 
treatment would be the same as in the F-RM treatment. Because of the bang-bang solution, when 
pcc > .25 (then ci,t = 20), the condition of Si,t > 1.25/pcc reduces to: pcc > 1.25/20 = .0625. This 
condition automatically holds due to the assumption that pcc > .25. Thus, in the C-RM treatment, 
if pcc > .25, subject i always discloses and contributes 20 until period 19; and i disclose Si,20 but 
contributes nothing in period 20.  
If pcc < .25, condition (#2) suggests that ci,t = 0 for all t in the C-RM treatment. With this 
optimal control, it is beneficial for i to not disclose Si,t since Si,t > f/(pcc∙r) does not hold. 
Summary 1: (a) The presence of a positive disclosure cost does not affect the free rider i’s 
incentive to mimic the behavior of a conditional cooperator under random matching.  
(b) If there is such a large fraction of conditional cooperators that pcc > .25 in the population, i 
always strategically contributes 20 and then discloses the state until period 19 in the C-RM and 
F-RM treatments. In period 20, i discloses the state but selects ci,20 = 0.  
(c) If pcc < .25, i contributes 0 in all periods in the C-RM and F-RM treatments; i never discloses 
the state in the C-RM treatment, while i randomly decides whether to disclose the state in each 
period in the F-RM treatment. 
 
 
B.1.2. C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments 
 In the two sorting treatments, disclosers (non-disclosers) are assured to be matched with 
disclosers (non-disclosers). Thus, the likelihood to interact with a conditional cooperator when i 
discloses her state is larger, compared with in the corresponding random matching environments. 
The likelihoods are given by: 
Prob[cc|disclose] = pcc/[pcc + yC-SortingpFR] ≥ pcc when disclosure is costly. 
Prob[cc|disclose] = pcc/[pcc + yF-SortingpFR] ≥ pcc when disclosure is free. 
The way to derive the optimal control path of a strategic free rider i in this case is identical to the 
case in Section B.1.1, except that the probability of being matched with a conditional cooperator 
in the Hamiltonian for t > 1 in Condition (#0) is Prob[cc|disclose], instead of pcc. By re-doing 
exactly the same calculation process explained in Section B.1.1, the following reputation 
building behaviors can be derived: 
Summary 2: If there is such a large fraction of conditional cooperators in the set of disclosers 
that Prob[cc|disclose]
 
> .25, i always contributes 20 and then discloses the state in the next 
period until period 19 in a given sorting treatment (in period 20, i discloses the state and then 
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selects ci,20 = 0). Since it is always the case that Prob[cc|disclose] ≥ pcc, when Prob[cc|disclose] 
> .25, the disclosure rate and average contribution amount are both higher in the C-Sorting (F-
Sorting) than in the C-RM (F-RM) treatment. By contrast, if Prob[cc|disclose] < .25 in the C-
Sorting treatment, i always contributes nothing and hides her state. If Prob[cc|disclose] < .25 in 
the F-Sorting treatment, i always contributes nothing and randomly decides whether to disclose 
in each period.  
 
B.1.3. Mandatory treatment 
 Under the assumption that no free riders other than i mimic the behavior of a conditional 
cooperator, the analysis for the Mandatory treatment is the same as the one studied in Section 
B.1.1. In the Mandatory treatment, there are two types as below in the population: 
pcc100: the percentage of those who act on the conditional cooperation strategy 
pFR100: the percentage of those who behave opportunistically (contribute 0) 
As the likelihood of being matched with a conditional cooperator is pcc, the setup with mandatory 
disclosure would not differ from the two random-matching treatments. 
Summary 3: Subjects’ contribution behaviors in the Mandatory treatment are the same as those 
in the C-RM and F-RM treatments outlined in Summary 1. 
 
B.2. When some free riders other than i mimic the behavior of a conditional cooperator 
 If it is instead assumed that some free riders other than i mimic the behavior of a 
conditional cooperator, then i’s mimicking incentives change.  
Assumption: pm,k100% of free rider types mimic the behavior of a conditional cooperator in the 
treatment k  {C-RM, F-RM, C-Sorting, F-Sorting}. Among the rest, (1 – pm,k)100% of free 
rider types, yk100% disclose their states. 
 This change in the assumption alters the likelihood that free rider i is matched with a 
person who acts according to the conditional cooperation strategy (denoted p in Proposition B.1) 
as follows:  
 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑅𝑀 = 𝑝𝑐𝑐 + 𝑝𝐹𝑅 ∙ 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑅𝑀  for both the C-RM and F-RM treatments.  𝑝 = 𝑝𝑆 = Prob[𝑐𝑐|𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒] = 𝑝𝑐𝑐+𝑝𝐹𝑅∙𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆𝑝𝑐𝑐+𝑝𝐹𝑅∙𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆 +𝑦𝑘∙𝑝𝐹𝑅∙(1−𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑆 ) for the F-Sorting treatment. 𝑝 = 𝑝𝑀 = 𝑝𝑐𝑐 + 𝑝𝐹𝑅 ∙ 𝑝𝑚,𝑘𝑀  for the Mandatory treatment.  
 
Here, the superscripts, RM, S and M, refer to the random matching, sorting, and Mandatory 
conditions, respectively.  
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The rest is to execute exactly the same calculation process explained in Section B.1. The 
threshold probability for the Bang-bang solution is the same as in Section B.1 (i.e., 25%), while 𝑝𝑅𝑀, 𝑝𝑆, and 𝑝𝑀 are used as p. 
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Appendix C: Additional Tables and Figures 
 
Table C.1. Treatment Differences in Subjects’ Behaviors based on a Regression Approach 
 
     
Dependent variable: Disclosure 
rate [%] 
Avg. contribution 
[ECUs] 
Avg.  
Belief [ECUs] 
Avg.  
Payoff [ECUs] 
Independent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
(#1) C-RM dummy {= 1 for the 
C-RM treatment; 0 otherwise} 
--- 1.99 
(1.39) 
1.75 
(1.16) 
.97 
(.82) 
(#2) C-Sorting dummy {= 1 for 
the C-Sorting treatment; 0 
otherwise}  
.29*** 
(.07) 
5.19*** 
(1.38) 
5.62*** 
(1.05) 
2.60*** 
(.80) 
(#3) F-RM dummy {= 1 for the F-
RM treatment; 0 otherwise}  
.30*** 
(.06) 
3.57** 
(1.52) 
2.91** 
(1.36) 
2.14** 
(.91) 
(#4) F-Sorting dummy {= 1 for 
the F-Sorting treatment; 0 
otherwise}  
.48*** 
(.05) 
4.07*** 
(1.58) 
3.56** 
(1.41) 
2.44*** 
(.94) 
(#5) Mandatory dummy {= 1 for 
the Mandatory treatment; 0 
otherwise}  
--- 7.62*** 
(1.24) 
7.32*** 
(2.47) 
4.57*** 
(1.29) 
     
Constant .23*** 3.91*** 4.12*** 22.3*** 
 (.041) (1.24) (1.00) (.74) 
Number of observations 304 456 456 456 
Reference group C-RM Baseline Baseline Baseline 
     
p-value (two-sided) for Wald χ2 tests to the following hypothesis:  
H0: (#1) = (#2) --- .0003*** .0000*** .0004*** 
H0: (#1) = (#3) --- .1450 .2920 .0612* 
H0: (#1) = (#4) --- .0729* .1187 .0290** 
H0: (#1) = (#5) --- .0027*** .0169** .0012*** 
H0: (#2) = (#3) .8245 .1266 .0056*** .4526 
H0: (#2) = (#4) .0030*** .3273 .0486** .8151 
H0: (#2) = (#5) --- .1937 .4529 .0735* 
H0: (#3) = (#4) .0001*** .6995 .6332 .6995 
H0: (#3) = (#5) --- .0398** .0702* .0398** 
H0: (#4) = (#5) --- .0784* .1266 .0784* 
     
Notes: Linear regressions. Standard errors, in parentheses, were clustered by session. Random effects were included to control 
for panel structure because treatment dummies are included as regressors. Session-average data were used. Observations from 
period 2 to 20 in the four treatments with information disclosure were used as data in column (1). Observations from period 2 to 
20 in all six treatments (C-RM, C-Sorting, F-RM, F-Sorting, Baseline, Mandatory) are used in columns (2) to (4).  
 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively.  
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Table C.2. A Comparison of Disclosers’ Contribution Behaviors Across the Four Treatments 
with Voluntary Information Disclosure (supplementing Fig. 2 of the paper) 
 
The following table includes two-sided p-values based on Wald (Chi-squared) tests to compare 
disclosers’ contribution behaviors or payoffs among the treatments (see Fig. 2 for the average 
contribution amounts and payoffs by treatment): 
[For disclosers’ average contributions:] 
Hypothesis: Chi-squared Prob > Chi-squared 
H0: C-RM = C-Sorting  .39 .5301 
H0: C-RM = F-RM .37 .5445 
H0: C-RM = F-Sorting 2.44 .1183 
H0: C-Sorting = F-RM .85 .3558 
H0: C-Sorting = F-Sorting 3.61 .0576* 
H0: F-RM = F-Sorting .36 .5492 
 
There is a weakly significant difference in the disclosers’ contribution amounts between the C-
Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, similar to the treatment difference between the two 
treatments discussed in the paper. Aside from this, no other treatment differences are found. 
[For disclosers’ average payoffs:] 
Hypothesis: Chi-squared Prob > Chi-squared 
H0: C-RM = C-Sorting  17.72 .0000*** 
H0: C-RM = F-RM 1.97 .1600 
H0: C-RM = F-Sorting 6.12 .0134** 
H0: C-Sorting = F-RM 5.40 .0201** 
H0: C-Sorting = F-Sorting 0.34 .5604 
H0: F-RM = F-Sorting 1.50 .2204 
 
There are significant differences in the disclosers’ payoffs behaviors between the C-RM and C-
Sorting treatments, between C-RM and F-Sorting treatments, and between C-Sorting and F-RM 
treatments. 
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Table C.3. Subjects’ Disclosure Decisions and Last Period Experiences 
Dependent variable: A dummy variable which equals 1 if subject i chose to disclose her state (last-period contribution amount) in period t {2, 3, 
…, 19}; and 0 otherwise. 
       
Treatment: (a) C-Sorting treatment (b) C-RM treatment 
 
 
All data i disclosed in 
period t – 1  
i did not disclose 
in period t – 1  
All data i disclosed in 
period t – 1  
i did not disclose 
in period t – 1  
Independent variable: (a1) (a2) (a3) (b1) (b2) (b3) 
       
       Period Number {= 2, 3, …, 19} -.0021 
(.0036) 
-.0036 
(.0055) 
.0024 
(.0049) 
-.0076* 
(.0026) 
-.00041 
(.0062) 
-.0035* 
(.0012) 
       
The contribution amount of subject i in 
period t – 1 --- 
.028** 
(.0076) 
.026 
(.014) --- 
.044*** 
(.0030) 
.031*** 
(.0039) 
       
Disclosed-Last-Period dummy  i’s 
period t – 1 matched partners’ 
contribution amounts 
--- 
.0023 
(.0033) --- --- 
.0037 
(.0033) 
.0010 
(.0019) 
Not-Disclosed-Last-Period dummy 
 i’s period t – 1 matched 
partners’ contribution amounts 
--- --- 
-.0040 
(.0030) --- 
.00076 
(.0021) 
.00010 
(.0012) 
Constant .56*** 
(.038) 
.39** (#1) 
(.091) 
.14 
(.16) 
.31*** 
(.027) 
.028 (#2) 
(.096) 
.038 
(.027) 
# of observations 792 404 344 864 194 622 
       
Notes: Linear regressions. Standard errors, in parentheses, were clustered by session. Individual fixed effects were included to control for panel structure. The Disclosed-
Last-Period dummy equals 1(0) if subject i’s period t – 1 partner disclosed (did not disclose) his/her last period contribution amount in period t – 1. The Not-Disclosed-
Last-Period dummy equals 1(0) if subject i’s period t – 1 partner did not disclose (disclosed) his/her last period contribution amount in period t – 1. Observations for 
which the period number is greater than 1 and less than 20 were included in the analyses, considering the strong end-game effect observed in the experiment. Results are 
similar even if data from period 20 are included (the results are omitted to conserve space).  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at 
the .01 level, respectively. 
 Two-sided t test result for H0: (#1) = (#2) 
t = 2.74, and p = .0062*** (i.e., Period t – 1 disclosers in the C-Sorting treatment were significantly more likely than disclosers in the C-RM 
treatment to disclose their states again in period t)  
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(Continued) 
 
       
Treatment: (c) F-Sorting treatment (d) F-RM treatment 
 All data i disclosed in 
period t – 1  
i did not disclose 
in period t – 1  
All data i disclosed in 
period t – 1  
i did not disclose 
in period t – 1  
Independent variable: (c1) (c2) (c3) (d1) (d2) (d3) 
       
       
Period Number {= 2, 3, …, 19} .00059 
(.0038) 
.0016 
(.0025) 
.012** 
(.0027) 
-.0017 
(.0023) 
.0062** 
(.0015) 
-.0017 
(.0033) 
       
The contribution amount of subject i in 
period t – 1 --- 
.022** 
(.0065) 
.038* 
(.012) --- 
.039*** 
(.0029) 
.040** 
(.0074) 
       
Disclosed-Last-Period dummy  i’s 
period t – 1 matched partners’ 
contribution amounts 
--- 
.0049** 
(.0014) --- --- 
-.0024 
(.0014) 
-.0093 
(.0041) 
Not-Disclosed-Last-Period dummy 
 i’s Period t – 1 matched 
partners’ contribution amounts 
--- --- 
.00014 
(.0019) --- 
.00033 
(.0023) 
-.0057 
(.0048) 
Constant .70*** 
(.039) 
.55*** (#3) 
(.090) 
.13 
(.099) 
.56*** 
(.025) 
.26*** (#4) 
(.035) 
.20*** 
(.030) 
# of observations 792 528 220 792 411 337 
       
 
 Two-sided t test result for H0: (#3) = (#4) 
t = 3.00, and p = .0027*** (i.e., Period t – 1 disclosers in the F-Sorting treatment were significantly more likely than disclosers in the F-RM 
treatment to disclose their states again in period t)  
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Table C.4. Subjects’ Decisions to Contribute by Cooperation Type (supplementing Fig. 4 of the 
paper)  
 
Dependent variable: subject i’s contribution amount to the joint account in period t. 
 
     
Treatment: C-RM F-RM C-Sorting F-Sorting 
Independent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
(a) Conditional cooperator dummy{= 1 if subject i 
is a conditional cooperator; and 0 if subject i is a free 
rider} 
.91 
(.95) 
1.42 
(2.50) 
-4.41 
(4.29) 
-.59 
(3.02) 
(b) Conditional cooperator dummy  Disclosure 
dummy{= 1 if subject i disclosed his/her last-period 
contribution in period t; and 0 otherwise} 
3.32*** 
(1.03) 
2.76*** 
(.50) 
2.28* 
(1.22) 
-.030 
(1.81) 
(c) Free rider dummy  Disclosure dummy 1.34 
(2.79) 
5.27*** 
(1.83) 
-2.27 
(2.97) 
-2.73 
(2.33) 
(d) Conditional cooperator dummy  Period 20  -1.05 -3.44*** -3.88*** -2.59* 
dummy{= 1 for period 20; 0 otherwise} (1.19) (1.06) (1.12) (1.35) 
(e) Free rider dummy  Period 20 dummy -4.27*** -3.78*** -13.9*** -.53*** 
 (.45) (1.02) (2.59) (.15) 
(f) Variable (b)  Period 20 dummy .11 1.35 -.64 1.52 
 (1.72) (2.57) (3.70) (2.92) 
(g) Variable (c)  Period 20 dummy 1.02 -2.95 5.11*** -4.78 
 (2.92) (2.02) (1.48) (4.23) 
Constant 4.38*** 
(.34) 
4.71** 
(2.36) 
11.74*** 
(3.63) 
8.98*** 
(2.47) 
     
# of observations 646 703 570 646 
     
 Two-sided p-values for Wald tests for the following comparisons regarding disclosers:  
H0: (a) + (b) = (c) [the null that the contribution amounts 
of conditional cooperators are the same as those of free 
riders before period 20] 
.4346 .7783 .9097 .3503 
H0: (a) + (b) + (d) + (f) = (c) + (e) + (g) [the null that 
the contribution amounts of conditional cooperators are 
the same as those of free riders in period 20] 
.0305** .0075*** .0216** .0620* 
 Two-sided p-values for Wald tests for the following comparison regarding non-disclosers:  
H0: (a) + (d) = (e) [the null that the contribution amounts 
of conditional cooperators are the same as those of free 
riders in period 20] 
.0007*** .4714 .0009*** .3583 
     
 
Notes: Linear regressions. Standard errors, in parenthesis, were clustered by session. Random effects were included 
to control for panel structure, because dummy variables are included as independent variables. Observations of only 
subjects who were classified as conditional cooperators or free riders were used in the regressions. The reference 
group in each regression is free riders before period 20. Data from period 1 were not used as there were no 
disclosure decisions for subjects to make in that period (see the experimental design section of the paper). 
   *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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RESULT A: Contribution decisions before period 20 (the end period)  
Contribution amounts of free riders who chose to disclose are not significantly different 
from those of conditional cooperators who likewise chose to disclose (see the Wald test results 
for H0: (a) + (b) = (c)). 
Contribution amounts of free riders who chose not to disclose are not significantly 
different from those of conditional cooperators who likewise chose not to disclose (see the 
coefficient estimates of variable (a)). 
 
 
 
RESULT B: Contribution decisions in period 20 (the end period)  
 Contribution amounts of free riders who chose to disclose are significantly lower than 
those of conditional cooperators that likewise chose to disclose. See the Wald test results for H0: 
(a) + (b) + (d) + (f) = (c) + (e) + (g). 
Contribution amounts of free riders who chose not to disclose are significantly lower 
than those of conditional cooperators that likewise chose not to disclose in treatments when 
disclosing was costly. See the Wald test results for H0: (a) + (d) = (e). 
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Fig. C.1. Period-by-Period Average Contributions and the Subjects’ Disclosure Rates 
 
 (I) C-RM and C-Sorting treatments 
 
(II) F-RM and F-Sorting treatments  
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(III) C-Sorting and Mandatory treatments 
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Note: The red dashed lines depicted in panels I(b) and II(b) show the average of last-period contributions made by the 
disclosers’ matched partners to the joint accounts in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, respectively. 
                                   (a) Avg. contribution [ECUs]         (b) Avg. belief on partners’ contributions [ECUs] 
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Fig. C.2. Cumulative Distribution of Individual Contribution Decisions by Treatment 
 
 
Fig. C.3. Average Conditional Contribution Schedule 
 
Notes: The above schedule is the average of all subjects’ conditional contribution schedules.  
Remark: (1) The spearman’s ρ correlation coefficient between own contribution amounts (y-axis) and the other 
group members’ average contribution amounts (x-axis) is 1.0000 (two-sided p-value < .001).  
(2) The slope, based on a linear regression, of the average conditional contribution schedule is .39, which is 
significantly positive (two-sided p-value < .001) and is significantly less than 1 (F-test, two-sided p-value 
< .001). The intercept is 2.41 ECUs, which is significantly positive (F-test, two-sided p-value < .001). 
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Fig. C.4. Subjects’ Average Contributions and Payoffs by Disclosure Decision in the First and 
Second Halves of the Experiment (supplementing Fig. 2 of the paper) 
 
 
 
(1) The first half (periods 2 to 10) 
 
 
(2) The second half (periods 11 to 20)  
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Fig. C.5. Subjects’ Disclosure Rates by the Size of their State 
 
 
               (a) The C-RM treatment                                                        (b) The F-RM treatment 
 
           (c) The C-Sorting treatment                                                        (d) The F-Sorting treatment 
(1) The first half (periods 2 to 10) 
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               (a) The C-RM treatment                                                        (b) The F-RM treatment 
 
           (c) The C-Sorting treatment                                                        (d) The F-Sorting treatment 
(2) The second half (periods 11 to 19)#1 
Note: #1 As in Fig. 3 of the paper, data from period 20 were not used. However, results are similar even if the 
disclosure decisions in period 20 are included (the results are omitted to conserve space). 
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Fig. C.6. Average Contribution Amounts by Disclosure Decision and by Conditional 
Contribution Type (supplementing Fig. 4 of the paper) 
 
 (a) Disclosers’ average contribution [ECUs] (b) Non-disclosers’ average contribution [ECUs] 
(1) The C-RM treatment 
 
 (a) Disclosers’ average contribution [ECUs] (b) Non-disclosers’ average contribution [ECUs] 
(2) The F-RM treatment 
Notes: Average across all periods before period 20. p-values (two-sided) in the figure are based on individual fixed 
effect linear regressions with robust standard errors clustered by session.   
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Fig. C.7. Average Contribution Amounts of Disclosers by the Total Number of Periods in which they Disclosed the States 
 
(1) The C-Sorting treatment 
  
(2) The F-Sorting treatment 
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Fig. C.8. Subject-by-Subject Patterns of Disclosure Decisions in the C-Sorting and F-
Sorting treatments (supplementing Fig. C.7 of the Appendix) 
 
 
(I) C-Sorting treatment 
  
period 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
s1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0
s2 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s3 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
s4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
s5 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s7 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
s8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s9 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1
s10 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
s11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
s12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
s13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
s14 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s15 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
s16 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
s17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s18 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s19 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
s20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
s21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1
s22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s23 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
s24 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
s25 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
s26 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s27 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
s28 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
s29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s30 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1
s31 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
s32 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0
s33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s34 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
s35 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1
s36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
s37 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
s38 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s39 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s40 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
s41 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s42 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s43 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s44 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
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(II) F-Sorting treatment   
Notes: 1 (0) refers to a case in which a subject did not disclose (disclosed) the state. Cases of 
non-disclosure are highlighted in yellow. 
Remark: These two panels reveal different disclosure patterns between the C-Sorting and F-
Sorting treatments. Panel I suggests that although some subjects switched back and forth 
between disclosing and not disclosing, those who constantly disclosed as well as those who 
constantly hid their behaviors are prevalent in the C-Sorting treatment. By contrast, Panel II 
shows that in the F-Sorting treatment, the history of hiding and also disclosing spread across 
almost all subjects. Most subjects switched between disclosing and not disclosing with some 
duration.  
period 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
s1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1
s2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
s3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s4 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
s5 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
s6 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
s7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
s10 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s11 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
s12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s13 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s14 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
s15 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
s16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s17 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
s18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
s19 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
s20 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
s21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s23 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
s24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
s26 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
s27 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
s28 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
s29 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
s30 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s31 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
s32 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s33 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
s34 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
s35 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
s36 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
s37 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
s38 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s39 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
s40 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1
s41 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
s42 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
s43 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
s44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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This observation can be partially confirmed by a regression analysis in which the dependent 
variable is subject i’s decision to disclose (=1 if i discloses; 0 otherwise) and the independent 
variables are (a) a dummy which equals 1(0) if i disclosed (did not disclose) in period t – 1, (b) 
the C-Sorting dummy which equals 1(0) for the C-Sorting (F-Sorting) treatment, and (c) the 
interaction term between variable (a) and variable (b). Observations in the C-Sorting and F-
Sorting treatments were used for this analysis. According to a random effect linear regression 
with robust standard errors clustered by session, variable (c) has a significantly positive 
coefficient estimate at the 10% level. This suggests that subjects who disclosed in period t – 1 in 
the C-Sorting treatment are more likely to continue to be a discloser in period t, compared with 
those in the F-Sorting treatment. 
  
34 
 
Appendix D: Analysis using Elicited Beliefs 
D.1. Conditional Disclosure Behaviors under Random Matching 
Analyses in Section 4 of the paper largely confirmed the implication based on conditional 
cooperation (Appendix B) that a strategic free rider would have material incentives to mimic the 
behavior of conditional cooperator, provided that p defined in Appendix B.1 is sufficiently high 
(e.g., Result 1(ii), Result 2(i), and Result 3(ii) of the paper). The importance of p can be checked 
further using the data of the two random-matching treatments. Disclosers in the C-RM and F-RM 
treatments were not assured to be matched with disclosers. If the above discussion is appropriate, 
subjects’ likelihoods of disclosing their states Si,t (last-period contribution amounts) in random-
matching treatments should depend on their beliefs on p.  
Consistent with this conjecture, subjects’ average disclosure rates were significantly 
positively correlated with their beliefs regarding the peers’ disclosure rates (Fig. D.1). Thus, the 
model of subjects’ conditional cooperation strategies can help explain the subjects’ average 
disclosure behaviors. The subjects’ conditional disclosure behaviors also resonate with the idea 
that subjects would positively respond to peers’ signals of future cooperation. People’s 
conditional behaviors have been observed in various contexts, including direct punishment of 
defectors (Kamei, 2014), third party punishment (Kamei, forthcoming), and costly gossiping 
(Kamei and Putterman, 2018). 
 
Result D.1: The larger the fraction of peers that subjects believed would disclose in the C-RM 
and F-RM treatments, the more likely they themselves were to disclose the states in those 
treatments. 
 
Fig. D.1. Subjects’ Average Disclosure Rates and Beliefs on the Peers’ Disclosure Behaviors 
 
             (a) The C-RM treatment                                        (b) The F-RM treatment 
Notes: Each point indicates each subject’s observation. The numbers in parenthesis in the linear equations (OLS) are 
robust standard errors. The slopes in panels (a) and (b) are significant at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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D.2. Subjects’ Responses to Peers’ Disclosure Decisions 
Some subjects’ hiding behaviors seen in Fig. 3 and Result 4 of the paper may be explained by 
their partners’ responses to non-disclosure or peers’ responses to disclosers’ reputation states. 
For example, a discloser may contribute a large amount even toward a non-discloser to maintain 
her high reputation state. This could be a force that makes hiding behaviors materially beneficial 
under random matching as seen in Result 3(ii) of the paper. Yet understanding the subjects’ 
behaviors is not that simple.  
First, subjects’ contribution amounts were positively correlated with their beliefs for both 
disclosers and non-disclosers in all treatments (Table D.1(a)).7,8 Second, independent of the 
treatment condition, the subjects’ beliefs were positively correlated with the partners’ states Sj,t 
when those states were observable (Table D.1(b)). The subjects’ reluctance to disclose when Si,t 
was low in the C-RM treatment can be partially explained by the positive disclosure cost. In this 
treatment, the subjects believed that masked partners would make contribution decisions 
indistinguishably from disclosers whose states Sj,t were zero (see the Partner-disclose dummy in 
Table D.1(b1)). However, if partner j disclosed and Sj,t > 0, subject i will believe that j would 
contribute more than a non-discloser, and this belief is increasing in the size of Sj,t. The estimates 
in Table D.1 suggest that the material benefit from disclosure exceeds the cost of one ECU for 
Sj,t > 7.27.9 In fact, subjects’ disclosure rates were low for all S ≤ 8 (see Fig. 3(a) of the paper).  
By contrast, hiding behaviors for subjects with Si,t > 0 in the F-RM treatment cannot be 
explained by material considerations. As in the C-RM treatment, these subjects treated masked 
partners as if they were disclosers with Sj,t = 0 (see again Table D.1(b1)). Thus, the masked 
subjects who had positive Sj,t could have obtained higher payoffs by disclosing the states and 
contributing zeros to maximize payoffs. Some subjects might not have recognized the benefit of 
disclosure, because their peers contributed non-negligible amounts on average even towards non-
disclosers to keep high reputation states.  
Subjects’ decisions not to disclose in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments are also 
difficult to rationalize with pecuniary considerations alone. A subject i’s partner would on average 
contribute 9.48+.216×Si,t (6.51 +.231×Si,t) when i discloses Si,t in the C-Sorting (F-Sorting) 
treatment.10 Because non-disclosers’ average contribution was 6.15 in the C-Sorting treatment, it 
would be materially beneficial for i to disclose the state, even if Si,t = 0 (notice that (9.48–
                                                          
7
 Additional regressions were conducted by also including a dummy which equals 1 if i’s period t partner did not 
disclose his state as an independent variable. The result shows that the dummy fails to obtain a significant 
coefficient, whereas variable (i) in Table D.1 has a significantly positive coefficient in every column. The results are 
omitted to conserve space.  
8
 Observations in period 20 were not included in the regressions since the standard end-game effect was observed. 
Results are similar even if observations in period 20 are included (the results are omitted to conserve space).  
9
 If the parameters in the table (.43 in panel (a) and .32 in panel (b1)) are used as lower estimates of Ci,t/Ci,j,tb and 
Ci,j,tb/Sj,t, respectively, an expectation of i’s additional contribution is calculated as .32×.43×Sj,t if Sj,t is observable. 
10
 This can be calculated by 6.77+.45× (6.03+.48× Si,t) in the C-Sorting and 4.03+.55× (4.51+.42× Si,t) in the F-
Sorting treatment using the coefficient estimates in panels (a) and (b2) of Table D.1. 
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6.15)×0.8 > 1). Likewise, disclosure was a materially beneficial action in the F-Sorting treatment 
because non-disclosers’ average contribution was 5.50, and 6.51 +.231×Si,t > 5.50 always.  
Table D.1. Subjects’ Contributions, Beliefs, and Partners’ States 
(a) Relationship between the subjects’ contributions and beliefs on partners’ contributions 
Dependent variable: Subject i’s contribution to her joint account in period t, where 2 ≤ t ≤ 19. 
 
         
Matching: Random matching Sorting 
Decision-maker i: Discloser Non-discloser Discloser#1 Non-discloser#2 
 
Independent variable: 
(1) 
C-RM 
(2) 
F-RM 
(3) 
C-RM 
(4) 
F-RM 
(5) 
C-Sorting 
(6) 
F-Sorting 
(7) 
C-Sorting 
(8) 
F-Sorting 
         
         
(i) i’s belief on partner j’s 
contribution in period t (𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑏 ) .43** (.083) .50*** (.076) .65*** (.061) .44** (.11) .45*** (.046) .55*** (.078) .39*** (.045) .26 (.18) 
Constant 7.65*** (.66) 
6.42*** 
(.65) 
1.02** 
(.32) 
1.69* 
(.59) 
6.77*** 
(.56) 
4.03*** 
(.69) 
3.58*** 
(.32) 
4.36** 
(.84) 
# of observations 201 431 663 361 423 559 369 233 
F 26.48 43.70 114.20 16.78 93.57 50.69 77.60 2.25 
Prob > F .0142 .0070 .0018 .0263 .0023 .0057 .0031 .2302 
         
 
 
(b) Relationship between the subjects’ belief formation and the partners’ states 
(b1) The C-RM and F-RM treatments 
Dependent variable: Subject i’s belief on her partner j’s contribution in period t, where 2 ≤ t ≤ 19 (𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡𝑏 ).#3 
 
     
Decision-maker i:: Discloser Non-discloser 
Independent variable: (1) C-RM (2) F-RM (3) C-RM (4) F-RM 
     
     
Partner-disclose dummy {=1 if i’s period t 
partner j disclosed his state in period t} 
1.66 
(2.38) 
-.56 
(.78) 
-.55 
(.72) 
-.22 
(.56) 
Partner-disclose dummy  j’s state [i.e., 
period t – 1 contribution amount] 
.33** 
(.094) 
.46** 
(.10) 
.32*** 
(.041) 
.34** 
(.098) 
Constant 6.50*** (.26) 
5.76*** 
(.38) 
4.33*** 
(.041) 
3.10*** 
(.42) 
# of observations 201 431 663 361 
F 89.93 32.51 845.06 47.05 
Prob > F .0021 .0093 .0001 .0054 
     
 
 
(b2) The C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments 
Dependent variable: Discloser i’s belief on her matched discloser j’s contribution in period t, where 2 ≤ t ≤ 19.#4 
 
   
 C-Sorting F-Sorting 
Independent variable: (1) (2) 
   
   
Subject i’s period t matched discloser j’s state [i.e., period 
t – 1 contribution amount] 
.48*** 
(.053) 
.42*** 
(.031) 
Constant 6.03*** (.74) 
4.51*** 
(.33) 
# of observations 384 520 
F 82.56 181.71 
Prob > F .0028 .0009 
   
 
Notes: Subject fixed effect linear regressions. Standard errors in parenthesis were clustered by session. Results are similar 
when subject random effect ordered probit regressions are instead used (the results are omitted to conserve space). #1 A 
small number of the disclosers were matched with non-disclosers. Results in columns (5) and (6) are similar even if these 
observations are excluded. #2 A small number of the non-disclosers were matched with disclosers. Results in columns (7) 
and (8) are similar even if these observations are excluded. #3 The reference group in panel (b1) is those whose matched 
partners did not disclose the states. #4 Only observations in which discloser i was matched with another discloser were used 
in panel (b2). *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Result D.2: (i) Subjects’ contribution amounts were significantly positively correlated with their 
beliefs regarding their partner’s contribution amounts. (ii) The subjects’ beliefs were 
significantly positively correlated with the partners’ states when these states were observable. 
(iii) In the C-RM and F-RM treatments, subjects believed that non-disclosers’ contribution 
behaviors would be the same as those of disclosers whose states Si,t were zero. (iv) In the C-
Sorting and F-Sorting treatments, some subjects did not disclose even though disclosing the 
states was a materially beneficial action.  
 
 
D.3. Other Analyses using Elicited Beliefs 
Table D.2. Subjects’ Disclosure Decisions and Beliefs on the Matched Partners’ Contribution 
Amounts in the C-Sorting and F-Sorting treatments. 
Dependent variable: Subject i’s session average belief on her partners’ contribution amounts to the joint 
accounts when i disclosed her state (in columns (1) and (3)) or did not disclose her state (in columns (2) and 
(4)) up to period 19 
     
 C-Sorting treatment F-Sorting treatment 
Independent variable: 
i disclosed 
(1) 
i did not disclose 
 (2) 
i disclosed 
 (3) 
i did not disclose 
 (4) 
     
     
The total number of periods 
in which subject i disclosed 
up to period 19 
.37** 
(.15) 
.084 
(.14) 
.17 
(.16) 
.041 
(.19) 
     
Constant 7.17*** 6.81*** 6.37*** 4.44* 
 (1.76) (1.48) (2.24) (2.50) 
     
# of observations 39#1 40#2 43#3 41#4 
F 6.53 .35 1.09 .05 
Prob > F .0148** .5551 .3028 .8306 
R-squared .1271 -.0168 .0021 -.0244 
     
 
Notes: Linear regressions. Observations in period 20 were not included as in other regression analyses (except the one with 
treatment effects), because of the strong end-game effect seen in the experiment. 
#1
 Five subjects had never disclosed their states until period 19 in the C-Sorting treatment; thus, the total number of observations 
is 39 (= 44 – 5). 
#2
 Four subjects had always disclosed their states until period 19 in the C-Sorting treatment; thus, the total number of 
observations is 40 (= 44 – 4). 
#3
 One subject had never disclosed his/her state until period 19 in the F-Sorting treatment; thus, the total number of observations 
is 43 (= 44 – 1). 
#4
 Three subjects had always disclosed their states until period 19 in the F-Sorting treatment; thus, the total number of 
observations is 41 (= 44 – 3). 
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
 
The result in the C-Sorting treatment (those who less frequently disclosed formed comparatively lower 
beliefs on their matched peers’ contribution behaviors, as seen in column (1)) is suggestive only, because 
the “total number of periods in which subject i disclosed up to period 19” variable does not obtain a 
significant coefficient once session clustering is added into the regression. 
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Fig. D.2. Conditional Cooperators’ Average Contributions and Beliefs when They Chose to 
Disclose, by the Frequency of Disclosure 
Conditional cooperators were first classified into (a) those who chose to disclose more than nine times and (b) 
those who chose to disclose less than ten times in the experiment. After that, the average contributions and 
beliefs were calculated for each category.  
As shown below, conditional cooperators who less frequently disclosed formed lower beliefs on their 
matched peers’ contribution behaviors, compared with the same types who frequently disclosed, although the 
differences in beliefs are not significant except for in the C-Sorting treatment. 
Among conditional cooperators, infrequent disclosers contributed significantly less than frequent 
disclosers, when they selected to disclose. This suggests that some conditional cooperators attempted to exploit 
other cooperators, instead of encouraging others to select conditional cooperation strategies. It follows that 
there are perhaps other aspects in human cooperativeness that are not captured by the classification method of 
Fischbacher et al. (2001). 
 
 
Notes: The figures show the average contributions and beliefs of conditional cooperators when they disclosed their 
states. The p-values in the figure are two-sided p-values, based on linear regressions (with robust standard errors 
clustered by session), where independent variables include a dummy which equals 1(0) if a subject disclosed (did 
not disclose) more than nine times in total in the experiment. In the regression, random effects were included to 
control for panel structure as in other regressions with dummy variables in this paper and in the Appendix. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Average contribution Average belief
Conditional cooperators
who disclosed less than
10 times
Conditional cooperators
who disclosed more than
9 times
p = .060* p = .096*
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Average contribution Average belief
Conditional cooperators
who disclosed less than
10 times
Conditional cooperators
who disclosed more than
9 times
p = .239
p = .000***
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
Average contribution Average belief
Conditional cooperators
who disclosed less than
10 times
Conditional cooperators
who disclosed more than
9 times
p = .200
p = .017**
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Average contribution Average belief
Conditional cooperators
who disclosed less than
10 times
Conditional cooperators
who disclosed more than
9 times
p = .984
p = .000***
(a) C-RM treatment (b) C-Sorting treatment 
(c) F-RM treatment (d) F-Sorting treatment 
39 
 
References: 
 
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. and Fehr, E. “Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from 
a public goods experiment.” Economics Letters, Vol. 71 (2001), pp. 397-404.  
Kamei, K. “Conditional Punishment.” Economics Letters, Vol. 124 (2014), pp. 199-202. 
Kamei, K. “Group Size Effect and Over-Punishment in the Case of Third Party Enforcement of 
Social Norms.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (forthcoming, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2018.04.002). 
Kamei, K. and Putterman, P. “Reputation Transmission without Benefit to the Reporter: a 
Behavioral Underpinning of Markets in Experimental Focus.” Economic Inquiry, Vol. 56 
(2018), pp. 158-172. 
  
40 
 
Appendix E: Results of the C-Sorting-N treatment 
The C-Sorting treatment achieved the highest efficiency, driven by the disclosers’ strong 
contribution behaviors, among the four main treatments (e.g., Fig. 1 of the paper). This part of 
the Appendix is devoted to a further analysis for this observation.   
The high performance of the C-Sorting treatment can be due to two effects: (A) the 
impact of disclosed information and (B) the impact of the cost to be matched with like-minded 
others. Effect (B) is absent in the F-Sorting treatment. If the presence of a positive cost is the key 
factor for the superior performance of the C-Sorting treatment, the disclosers’ benefits from 
sorting may remain high even if they do not have disclosed information. As discussed in Section 
2 of the paper, the “C-Sorting-N” treatment was conducted to study the relative importance of 
these two effects. In this treatment, subjects who paid one ECU were matched with another who 
paid it. However, their last-period contributions were not revealed. On average 53.6% of subjects 
paid the fee. As in the C-Sorting treatment, the average contributions were clearly different 
between the payers and non-payers (Fig. E.1). The difference is significant (p < .0001, two-sided 
Wald test) and large, around 7 ECUs. On average, the contributions of the payers were not 
significantly different from those of the disclosers in the C-Sorting treatment (Fig. E.2). 
 
Fig. E.1. Contributions and the Percentage of the Payers in the C-Sorting-N treatment 
 
 
 
 
Nevertheless, the average contribution is 2.51 ECUs lower for the payers than for the 
disclosers in the C-Sorting treatment (Fig. E.2). In addition, despite the lack of significant 
difference in the average contribution, the average payoff is significantly lower for the payers 
than for the disclosers in the C-Sorting treatment (see again Fig E.2). This suggests that disclosed 
information is essential for a payer to induce her matched payer to contribute large amounts. 
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As for the treatment differences, the average contribution in the C-Sorting-N treatment is 
6.31 ECUs, which is around 61% higher than that in the Baseline treatment. However, the former 
is significantly lower than that in the C-Sorting treatment (column (1) in Table E.1). 
Qualitatively the same difference is found when average payoffs are compared between the C-
Sorting-N and C-Sorting treatments (column (2) in Table E.1). 
In short, there was an effect of having a positive disclosure cost; however, even 
accounting for this, the presence of disclosed information remained crucial for the high 
performance in the C-Sorting treatment. 
 
Result E.1: The average contribution and average payoff were both significantly lower in the C-
Sorting-N than in the C-Sorting treatment. 
 
Table E.1. The Impact of Paying a Cost without Information Disclosure in the C-Sorting-N 
treatment 
   
Dependent variable: Average 
contributions in 
period t 
Average 
payoffs in 
period t 
Independent variable: (1) (2) 
   
   
C-Sorting dummy (#1) 5.19*** 
(1.40) 
2.60*** 
(.82) 
   
C-Sorting-N dummy (#2) 2.21 
(1.58) 
.80 
(.93) 
   
   
Constant 3.91*** 
(1.26) 
22.3*** 
(.76) 
   
# of observations 228 228 
     
p-value (two-sided) for Wald test to the 
following hypothesis: 
H0: (#1) = (#2) .0082*** .0038*** 
   
Notes: Linear regressions. Standard errors, in parentheses, were clustered by session. Random effects were included 
to control for panel structure because treatment dummies are included as regressors. Dependent variable is session-
average contributions or payoffs in period t. Observations of the C-Sorting, C-Sorting-N and Baseline treatments in 
period 2 to 20 were used in the regressions. The reference group is data from the Baseline treatment.  C-Sorting 
dummy equals 1 for the C-Sorting treatment; and 0 otherwise. C-Sorting-N dummy equals 1 for the C-Sorting-N 
treatment; and 0 otherwise.  
  *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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Fig. E.2. Average Contributions and Payoffs by Disclosure Decision in the C-Sorting-N treatment 
  
 
Notes: The session-average contributions and payoffs were first calculated by disclosure decision. Next, they were 
averaged by treatment. p-values (two-sided) were calculated based on Wald tests using the estimation of individual 
random effect linear regressions standard errors clustered by session. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .10 
level, at the .05 level and at the .01 level, respectively. 
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